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GOVERNMENT SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION:
THE LIMITS OF OFFICIAL PARTISANSHIP
EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR, *
There is something basically unwise and undemocratic about a sys-
tem which taxes the public to finance a propaganda campaign aimed
at persuading the same taxpayers that they must spend more tax
dollars to subvert their own independent judgment. I am reminded
of W.C. Fields' admonition: "Never give a sucker an even break."
Senator William Fullbright**
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most sacred precept of the American credenda is found in
the expression "sovereignty of the people." The notion that public officials
possess only the appearance of sovereignty while genuine authority remains in
the hands of the governed is at the heart of our republican form of govern-
ment.' The idea that democratic government ultimately rests upon the lead-
ership and support of genuine citizen opinion is fundamentally expressed in
the strict constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press.' The threat to a democratic structure of power posed by the ability of
* A.B. 1970 University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1973 University of Kentucky;
LL.M. 1975, George Washington University. Associate Professor of Law, University of
Dayton School of Law.
**115 CONG. REC. 36, 344 (1969).
On the theory of democratic government, Yves R. Simon states:
that the men in power are delegated by the people, that they are given
definite missions by the people, and that in the fulfillment of their missions
they remain strictly subordinated to the people that delegated them. Thus
the governing person is a leader entirely under the control of those whom
he leads. Authority belongs not to the leaders but to the led. Or perhaps it
should he said that real leadership, the one which is unseparable from au-
thority, belongs not to the government but to the governed.
Y. SIMON, PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 146 (6th ed. 1966) [hereinafter
cited as Sim°NI. On the process of amending the powers of representative government,
James Madison wrote:
As the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is
from them that the constitutional charter, under which the several
branches of government hold their power, is derived; it seems strictly con-
sonant. to the republican theory, to recur to the same original authority, ...
whenever it. may be necessary to enlarge, diminish, or new—model the pow-
ers of government.
THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 339 (J. Madison) U. Cook ed. 1961).
With respect to the first amendment., the United States Supreme Court has
stated, "speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence
of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). See First. Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. I3ellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.31 (1978) ("Government is forbidden
to assume the task of ultimate judgment, lest the people lose their ability to govern
themselves."); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (self-government
suffers when those in power suppress competing views on public issues "from diverse
and antagonistic sources").
578
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government to impede or influence the formation and expression of citizen
opinion through official action was a principal concern of our country's
founders. 3
In this respect, a characteristic distinguishing democratic from totalitarian
government is that while a democracy attempts to facilitate and ascertain pub-
lic opinion and establish policy in accordance therewith,' an autocracy at-
tempts to engineer public opinion in support of its decisions. 5 Accordingly,
To link oneself with the masses, one must act in accordance with the needs
and wishes of the masses. All work done for the masses must start from
their needs and not from the desire of any individual, however, well-
intentioned. it often happens that objectively the masses need a certain
change, but subjectively they are not yet conscious of the need, not yet
willing or determined to make the change. In such cases, we should wait
patiently. We should not make the change until through our work, most of
the masses have become conscious of the need and are willing and deter-
mined to carry it out.
MAO TSE-TUNG'S QUOTATIONS: THE RED GUARD'S HANDBOOK (1967) (emphasis added),
cited in Lewis, The High Court: Final . . . But Fallible, 19 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 528, 569
n.173 (1968).
3 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 52, 53 U. Madison). In 1801, President Jefferson
issued the following order:
The President of the United States has seen with dissatisfaction
officers of the General Government taking on various occasions active parts
in elections of the public functionaries, whether of the General or of the
State Governments. Freedom of elections being essential to the mutual in-
dependence of governments and of the different branches of the same
government, so vitally cherished by most of our constitutions, it is deemed
improper for officers depending on the Executive of the Union to attempt
to control or influence the free exercise of the elective right. This I am
instructed, therefore, to notify to all officers within my Department hold-
ing their appointments under the authority of the President directly, and
to desire them to notify to all subordinate to them. The right of any officer
to give his vote at elections as a qualified citizen is not meant to be re-
strained, nor, however, given, shall it have any effect to his prejudice; but
it is expected that he will not attempt to influence the votes of others nor
take any part in the business of electioneering, that being deemed in-
consistent with the spirit of the Constitution and his duties to it.
10 J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 98-99 (1899).
4 See Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661, 677, 536 P.2d 1337, 1348, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 377, 388 (1975). Observing that "[a] fundamental goal of a democratic society is
to attain the free and pure expression of the voters' choice of candidates," the Califor-
nia court concluded that "our state a rid federal Constitutions mandate that the
government must, if possible, avoid any feature that might adulterate or, indeed, frus-
trate, that free and pure choice." See generally Rourke, How Much Should The Govern-
ment Tell? 44 SATURDAY REVIEW 17 (1961).
5 The totalitarian "father knows best" doctrine is practiced in both Russia and
China. Professor Berman writes:
The implication of the Soviet concept of ... [law] is that people in
general do not know their rights and duties but must be taught them, and
that these rights and duties are not something which they possess, but
rather are instruments used by the state to inculcate the legal and social
psychology which the leaders believe to be proper.
Berman, Soviet Justice and Soviet Tyranny, 55 Comm. L. REV. 795 (1955), cited in Lewis,
The High Court: Final . . . But Fallible, 19 CASE W.' RES. L. REV. 528, 569-70 (1968).
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when the people are sovereign, Paul Louis Courier once wrote, government is
like a coach driver hired and paid by those whom he drives. The coach driver
leads, but only where his patrons want to go and by the ways of their own
choice.' Since the horse and carriage days of Courier's time, modern gov-
ernment has become increasingly administrative, however, and the respon-
sibilities of public officials have greatly expanded.' It is now common legisla-
tive practice to delegate to a government agency the responsibility to achieve a
broad policy objective with the precise methods of implementation left to the
agency's discretion.' Government agencies increasingly interpret this delega-
tion of responsibility to include the power to engage in political campaigns on
issues related to an agency's delegated task. 9 The government's use of public
resources to manufacture citizen support for a partisan viewpoint on political
issues raises serious questions concerning the integrity of the democratic pro-
cess. It is a truism that, if a governing structure based upon widespread
genuine citizen opinions is to survive as a viable democracy, it must place legal
resraints on the government's ability to manipulate the formulation and ex-
pression of that opinion.
Our legal system in the past has responded to the problem of goverment
officials exploiting their authority for partisan ends largely by invalidating the
negative restraint of official censorship. Although more subtle than censor-
ship, official partisanship thorough the affirmative act of disseminating prop-
aganda in support of a partisan viewpoint may pose as great or greater
danger to political rights of free expression." The affirmative use of official
6
 Paul Lewis Courier, Lewes an re'dacteur du Censeur, Lcttre X, 10, Oeuvres
62-63 (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1845), cited in SIMON, supra note 1, at 147-48. In this re-
gard, it is interesting to note that just live years after adoption of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court of the United States rejected the idea of the United States government
or any of its officials as "sovereign." The people of the United States, as Mr. justice
Wilson noted "have reserved the supreme power in their own hands; and on that.
supreme power made the State dependent, instead of being sovereign...." Chisholm
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dal].) 419, 457 (1793).
7
 On this point Robert Lurch writes:
Among the revolutions of our time is an administrative revolution. Ad-
ministrators arc no longer merely administrators in the old sense of the
word. They are now heavily involved in doing what the Fathers of the
Republic surely would have called legislative and judicial. Anyone who still
believes that law-making is mostly done by legislatures or that controversies
are mostly settled in the courts, is far behind the times.
R. LORCH, DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9 (1973).
See Miller, The Public Interest Undefined, 10 J. PUB. L. 184 (1962). See generally
J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT (1978); D. WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1957).
9 See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Denver School Dist. 1, 459 F.
Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1978); Stanson v. Mon, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1976); Miller v. Miller, 87 Cal. App. 3d 762, 151 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1978); Krantzlcr
v. Board of County Comilla -5, 354 So. 2c1 126 (Fla. 1978); Anderson v. City of Boston,
78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297, 380 N.E.2d 628 (1978); Stern v. Kramarsky, 84 Misc. 2c1 447,
375 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 698-99 (Vintage
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as EMERSON]. As Professor Emerson has observed,
[title system of freedom of expression is normally viewed from the
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authority and public resources for partisan ends surely deserves closer
scrutiny by the legal community."
This article will analyze the statutory and constitutional restraints on offi-
cial partisanship.' 2 In view of increasing citizen support for direct voter
participation in the resolution of political questions, particular attention will
be given to government attempts to influence the outcome of referenda and
elections of a similar character. The United States Supreme Court has yet to
rule on many of the questions raised by official partisanship, but state case law
and several relevant federal decisions provide some guidance for an analysis
of the constitutional and statutory issues involved. Part I of the article sets the
context for later discussion; focusing on examples of official partisanship it
attempts to define the nature of the problem. Part II examines the adequacy
and constitutionality of existing statutory restraints and suggests the need for
further legislation. Part III examines constitutional restraints on official parti-
sanship under the first amendment and the guaranty clause. Based on the
statutory and constitutional restraints, it will be suggested that official
partisanship is not speech protected by the first amendment, and, in fact, that
amendment rights of the citizens themselves militate against permitting unre-
strained official partisanship.
I. THE CONTEXT
The mechanics of official partisanship are limited only by government's
imagination and the tools at hand. The following scenario illustrates some of
the possibilities for such government action. The legislature of a particular
state calls a referendum to allow its citizens to speak directly on a proposed
amendment to the United States Constitution. The proposed amendment
would establish a ceiling on federal spending. The President of the United
States, who believes that the amendment is not in the country's best interests,
issues a statement directing the heads of all federal departments and agencies
laissez-faire perspective. Attention is focused upon the rights of the private
participants in the system and upon the obligation of the government to
refrain from interference with, to protect, to eliminate distortions in, and
to affirmatively promote the system. The reality is, of course, that the gov-
ernment itself participates in the system, both as communicator and lis-
tener. This government participation is active, varied and extensive.
Id. at 697.
" As Professor Chaffee points out, government as a party to communications
"is a subject hitherto neglected." 2 Z. CHAFFEE JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNI-
CATIONS 723 (1947). Professor Emerson similarly states: "Though government partici-
pation m a system of freedom of expression is of great and growing significance very
little attention has been paid to it. No comprehensive effort to appraise the govern-
ment role or to formulate principles of control has been undertaken." EMERSON, supra
note 10, at 698.
12 "Official partisanship," as used herein, is defined as the use of public re-
,
sources by government officials to promote an exclusively partisan viewpoint on struc-
tured political issues. In the context of this definition of official partisanship, the
phrase "structured political issues" refers to political questions whose resolution is the
subject of a pending authoritative political process, including referendum type elec-
tions, constitutional amendments, and legislative law making.
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"to make the most of public appearance opportunities to demonstrate the
administration's position on this amendment" and "to include in public
speeches, where appropriate, language emphasizing the importance of defeat-
ing the proposed amendment." 13 A regional director of a federal agency,
whose office is located within the state, writes a memo asking each supervisor
and manager in the region to comply with the President's directive regardless
of personal preference or political opinion.' 4 The federal bureaucracy goes
into high gear. One federal agency prints and sends into the state, at taxpayer
expense, over 78,000 propaganda pamphlets entitled, Shedding Light on Facts
About Federal Spending.'s A second federal agency grants thousands of tax-
payer dollars to a private organization to urge defeat of the amendment.'5 A
third federal agency prints and distributes, at public expense, thousands of
copies of a booklet entitled, Teachers Guide for Government Spending.' 7 The
booklets tell school children what will happen to Maxwell the Mouse if a ceil-
ing is imposed on government spending.
At the state level, public officials, who believe that the amendment should
be defeated, gear up for a campaign of their own. One state agency prints
and distributes, at public expense, an official pamphlet which urges citizens to
"VOTE NO" on the proposed amendment," while a second spends taxpayer
dollars to finance anti-amendment posters, bumper-stickers, an advertising
float, and newspaper, radio and television advertising.' 9 A third state agency
hires professionals to lobby for the amendment's defeat." A fourth uses its
facilities for rallies and campaign meetings. 2 ' A fifth state agency uses it
" See text and note at note 25 infra.
' 4 See text and note at note 26 infra.
15 See text and notes at notes 27-31 infra.
"' See text and note at note 32 infra.
" While the merits of the controversial SST aircraft were being debated, the
U.S. Department of Transportation printed and distributed 50,000 copies of a
seventy-three page Teachers Guide for SST. D. Wist:, THE POLITICS OF LYING 200 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as WIsE]. The booklet clearly presented a biased view of the aircraft.
One story in the teacher's guide tells of how "Maxwell the Mouse" finds a house
soundproofed from jet noises. Id. The booklet encouraged students to "play airport"
and to test themselves as to how they would "write the advertisements for the first
flight on the SST." Id.
18 In New Jersey, shortly before citizens were to vote on a local school bond
issue, the local Board of Education printed an 18 page propaganda booklet urging
citizens to "vote yes" on the issue. Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds v. Board of Educ. 13
N.J. 172, 175, 98 A.2d 673, 674 (1953).
1" In Los Angeles shortly before citizens were to vote on a bond issue to fi-
nance extension of their public utility service, the Board of Public Service Commis-
sioners, which managed the utility, authorized the expenditure of utility revenues to
finance a campaign to generate voter support for the proposed bond issue. Mines v.
Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 257 P. 530 (1927). Public revenues were used to purchase
bumper stickers, posters, advertising floats and newspaper advertising to propagandize
in favor of the bond issue. Id. at 276, 257 P. at 532. See Porter v. Tiffany, 11 Or. App.
542, 502 P.2d 1385 (1972).
2" See Sims v. Moeur, 41 Ariz. 486, 19 P.2d 679 (1933).
21
 In 1978, shortly before citizens in Colorado were to vote on an amendment
to that state's constitution which would impose restrictions on the expenditure of pub-
lic funds, the Denver Board of Education passed a resolution officially opposing the
amendment and specifically approving the use of school "equipment, materials,
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facilities to distribute private campaign materials which urge defeat of the
amendment." The public schools compel children to listen to the radio
broadcasts of opponents of the amendment. 2" The largest city in the state
donates over one hundred thousand dollars to a statewide Mayor's Associa-
tion, hires two political consulting firms, and establishes an "Office of Public
Information on Government Spending" in a political campaign to defeat the
amendment. 24 The scenario outlined above is riot an Orwellian fantasy.
Every government action mentioned has occurred in different contexts. For
example, just such a directive by the President" and memo by the regional
director of a federal agency" were issued in support of the Equal Rights
Amendment.
A second example occurred in June of 1976, shortly before Californians
voted on a statewide referendum on nuclear power plants, when the United
States Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) printed and
distributed in California over 78,000 pamphlets Shedding Light on Facts About
Nuclear Energy." These pamphlets, described as "religious leaflets," 28 were
designed to influence voter opinion on the safety of nuclear plants. A con-
gressionally requested investigation, by the General Accounting Office (GAO)
concluded that the ERDA pamphlets were "propaganda."" The GAO found
that the pamphlets "did not discuss the issues in sufficient depth to provide
an objective statement on the current state of nuclear power.""" Further, the
GAO found that ERDA had "presented certain facts and omitted others in a
way which resulted in a misleading document.""
A third example took place in 1975, shortly before Kentucky citizens
voted in a statewide referendum, and the United States Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration funneled a federal grant of over one hundred
thousand dollars to a private organization known as Kentucky Citizens for
Judicial Improvement, Inc. 32 This organization employed the grant to pro-
supplies, facilities, funds, and the employees" to urge defeat of the amendment.
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Denver School Dist. #1, 459 F. Stipp. 357, 358
(D. Colo. 1978).
22 See Stern v. Kramarsky, 84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
23 Among other actions, a local Board of Education in New Jersey compelled
school children to listen to a radio broadcast over a public address system which dis-
cussed the merits of a proposed school bond. Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds v. Board
of Educ., 13 N.J. 172, 176, 98 A.2d 673, 674-75 (1953).
24 See. Anderson v. City of Boston, 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297, 380 N.E.2d 628
(1978).
23 ERA. The Bureaucrats Exert Pressure for Endorsement, The Cincinnati Enquirer,
Feb. 5, 1979 at A-10.
26 Bureau of Reclamation Lower Colorado Regional Office, U.S. Department
of the Interior, Memorandum LC-515 970.4 (Oct. 23, 1978).
27 U.S. ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, SHEDDING
LIGHT ON FACTS ABOUT NUCLEAR ENERGY (1976), reproduced in GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE REPORT No. B-130961 (Sept. 30, 1976) :
28 Id. at 26.
28 Id. at iv.
3° Id. at 35.
31 Id.
32 U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, GRANT No. 74-DF-
04-0014. The alleged purpose of the grant was for the "education of the citizenry"
about "judicial modernization." Id.
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mote the referendum of an amendment to the Kentucky Constitution altering
the Kentucky judicial system. These are but three acts of official partisanship
upon which the scenario is based; others are merely noted. All are now a
matter of record.
Every governing regime is likely to engage in sonic degree of official
partisanship. In fact, it would be almost impossible to exclude official parti-
sanship from any practical governing arrangement, even a representative
democracy. Under our constitutional system some forms of official partisan-
ship are tolerated. For example, elected officials often endorse a particular
viewpoint on controversial questions during their campaign for re-election
and in support of the election of other members of their political party. But
voters in the experienced democracy quickly learn to discount many political
statements made in the context of an election. Many voters simply assume that
the official seeking re-election will view the past with pride and point to the
future with confidence while the candidate out of office will deplore the past
and view the future with alarm. This is the routine drama of representative
politics, and though the incumbent is at an advantage as a result of holding
office, it is difficult to imagine a practical governing arrangement that would
eliminate this advantage. Moreover, so long as elected officials limit their use
of public resources in this regard to the publicly financed amenities of elected
office, such as office space and a telephone, this form of official partisanship
is acceptable as inherent in the nature of political office. More importantly
this limited form of official partisanship by elected officials is acceptable be-
cause it poses little threat to the integrity of the democratic process, if the
amenities of elected office are allocated on a non-partisan basis and are limited
to the minimum necessary for effective operation of the representative sys-
tem. Once elected officials reach beyond the amenities of elected office, how-
ever, or use public resources to promote a partisan view on structured politi-
cal questions, official partisanship is at odds with the democratic notion that
public policy rests upon genuine citizen opinion.
More threatening to the integrity of the democratic process than official
partisanship by elected officials is the use of public resources by non-political
officials and agencies to create voter support for a particular political view-
point. Since public agencies speak with official authority and operate with
substantial resources, any partisan view espoused by an agency may gain un-
deserved public acceptance. Worse, official partisanship by public agencies in-
sulates public policy from democratic choice. Toleration of this type of official
partisanship preserves the governing structure's democratic form without its
democratic function. Since a fundamental goal of a democracy is to promote
free and genuine citizen opinion, the notion that the non-political aspects of
government can take sides in election contests or bestow an advantage on one
of several competing factions must be emphatically rejected.
It is essential, and at the same time difficult, to control public agencies'
practice of official partisanship because of the frequent delegation of author-
ity to such agencies to perform a variety of informational functions. Many
government agencies are authorized to investigate the nature of a public prob-
lem and to recommend alternative solutions or to adopt and implement reg-
ulatory programs. Most public agencies are required to inform the public of
their policies, rules, procedures and decisions." Other agencies are dele-
March 1980]	 OFFICIAL PARTISANSHIP
	
585
gated authority to warn citizens of potential dangers to public health and
safety or to disseminate information to assist private research and business
operations.34 These information and communication activites are not only
consistent with democratic theory but are necessary to the effective operation
of a democratic system. 35
There arc instances, therefore, in which government funds are used
lawfully to express views on matters of importance, where taxpayers may
disagree with those views. 36 With respect to structured political questions,
however, the law must draw a line between publicly financed government
communications informing the public of the internal workings of government,
such as hearings, debates, rules and decisions, and publicly financed govern-
ment campaigns which interfere with the external political process by attempt-
ing to affect the outcome of citizen opinion and elections. 37 If the democratic
" 3 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976),
34 It should be pointed out that in recent years the governmental "informa-
tion" function increasingly involves public relations communications whose purpose is
merely self-serving agency image-making. For example, a 1971 study by the Office of
Management ancl Budget found that NASA with a 12.2 million public relations budget
and a staff of 359 ranked only third among all federal agencies in accountable public
relations expenditures. WISE, supra note 17, at 209. Like most federal agencies, NASA
has undertaken, and continues, a massive effort to protect what some citizens believe is
an inflated and wasteful budget. NASA promotes it Own worth in films, booklets, and
color lithographs produced and circulated at taxpayer expense. NASA's August 1976
catalog of "Educational Publications" lists, for example a pamphlet entitled New Hori-
zons which, according to NASA, highlights "NASA's contributions to the solution of
pressing national problems." Also listed is Skylab and the Sun, a booklet, according to
NASA, describing "what mankind stands to gain froM the Skylab experience."
35 Professor Emerson states:
Participation by the government in the system of expression is an essential
feature of any democratic society. It enables the government to inform,
explain, and persuade—measures especially crucial in a society that at-
tempts to govern itself with a minimum use of force. Government partici-
pation also greatly enriches the system; it provides facts, ideas, and exper-
tise not available from other sources. In short, government expression is a
necessary and healthy part of the system.
EMERSON, supra note 10, at 698.
"" Sec text at notes 241-42 infra. While the focus of this article is government
speech relating to structured politicial questions, the general development and imple-
mentation of sophisticated propaganda techniques by government outside of the tradi-
tional educational context is itself a subject which merits closer attention. For example,
an Office of Management and Budget study in 1971 disclosed that HEW had a public
relations budget of $27.4 million and a staff of 737. WISE, supra note 17, at 210.
HEW's recent propaganda efforts have been largely directed toward America's chil-
dren. One such undertaking is its 1976 "integrated children's television series for
minority and non-minority children." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, DESCRIPTIONS OF CHILDREN'S TELEVISION SERIES 1 (Oct. 1976) (produced
under the Emergency School Aid Act). This series was produced, in HEW's words,
"with a home viewing audience in mind." Id. One television series entitled Carrascolen-
das is targeted for children 3 through 9 years of age and stresses, in HEW's words,
"affective (emotional) and attitudinal concerns." Id. Regardless of whether one agrees
with the goals of these campaigns, the implications of such efforts by Washington
bureaucrats to shape the "emotional and attitudinal" makeup of America's children
through home television viewing should give one pause for concern.
37
 Admittedly, it is difficult to draw a precise line between those government
communications whose primary purpose is to inform and those government actions
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process is to operate with a minimum of distortion, government information
and communication functions in connection with structured political questions
must be limited by law to those activities necessary for the effective operation
of the process.
In summary, the use of public resources by government officials, espe-
cially those officials occupying non-political agency positions, to influence the
development or expression of citizen opinion upon structured political ques-
tions runs counter to fundamental democratic precepts. As we have seen, such
official partisanship is very real. The remainder of this article explores the
existing legal restraints upon the unfettered exercise of political partisanship
by government officials, beginning with the statutory restraints and ending
with the constitutional restraints.
II. STATUTORY RESTRAINTS
Courts traditionally are inclined to decide cases whenever possible by
statutory construction rather than by ruling on constitutional issues. 38 For
the most part, in cases involving official partisanship, courts have followed this
tradition of avoiding unnecessary constitutional rulings by basing their deci-
sions on the statutory authority of the government agency involved." This
section discusses existing statutory restraints on public agencies and their
employees with respect to official partisanship, and examines the adequacy
and constitutionality of these restraints.
A. Lack of Delegated Authority
Citizens have successfully challenged acts of official partisanship with the
argument. that the delegation of authority in the agency's enabling statute, acts
as a statutory restraint upon the agency's use of public monies. 41 These chal-
lenges arc based upon two fundamental legal principles. The first is the tenet
of public law that a government agency is a creature of statute and, as such,
may exercise only those powers expressly conferred or necessarily implied in a
delegation of authority." The second principle supporting these challenges
is that govenment officials hold public money in trust to be spent only for
whose primary purpose is to persuade. Statements circulated by the government for
whatever reason are likely to have consequences upon citizen opinion formation. In
many cases, however, the line between information and propaganda will be clear, such
as when a public agency urges citizens to "vote no" on an issue, or when the informa-
tion disseminated is misleading in a partisan manner. Drawing the line in close cases is
no more difficult than making the decisions required in so many other areas of law
where careful consideration must be given to the factual context of particular events.
See text at notes 68-74 infra.
38 See United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) wherein
the Supreme Court states: "it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional]
question may he avoided." Id. at 369.
"" See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Denver School Dist. #1, 459
F. Stipp. 357 (I). Colo. 1978); Stanson v. Mon, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal.
Rpt r. 697 (1976).
4 " See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 87 Cal. App. 3d 762, 151 Cal. Rpt•. 197 (1978).
41 See Soriano v. United States, 494 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 1974).
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purposes authorized by law. 42 In this regard, the law which could authorize
such expenditures is the delegation of authority in the agency's enabling stat-
ute. Under these two principles, courts have invalidated acts of official parti-
sanship as unauthorized and thereby illegal when engaged in by government
agencies, 43 local boards of education," municipalities,'" and government cor-
porations. 4" Typically, public agencies have defended such challenges with
the arguments that expenditures for official partisanship are authorized as an
inherent power of the agency to promote the public interest on issues related
to the agency's delegated task 47 or as a power necessarily implied in an ex-
press grant to the agency of informational authority." Both of these argu-
ments have met with little success in the courts, which uniformly hold that the
authority to promote a partisan viewpoint on a structured political question is
created only by an explicit grant of such authority to the agency.
" See, e.g., Stern v. Kramarksy, 84 Misc. 2d 447, 452, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235, 239
(Sup. Ct. 1975); Porter v. Tiffany, 11 Or. App. 542, 502 P.2d 2385 (1972).
43 See, e.g., Sims v. Moeur, 41 Ariz. 486, 19 P.2d 679 (1933).
44
 See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Deliver School Dist. # I, 459
F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1978).
45 See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Boston, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297, 38 N.E.2d
628 (1978).
46 See, e.g., Porter v. Tiffany, 11 Or. App. 542, 502 P.2d 1385 (1972).
47 See, e.g., Sims v. Mocur, 41 Ariz. 486, 19 P.2d 679 (1933). In Sims the state
workmen's compensation commission spent monies from the workers' compensation
fund in a campaign to defeat a voter referendum measure which, if approved, would
have abolisted the commission. Specifically, the commission had hired lobbyists to
campaign against the referendum and had financed voter "propaganda" circulars and
letters, as well as newspaper and radio advertising. Id. at 490, 19 P.2d at 680-81. Re-
jecting the commission's argument that it possessed inherent authority to make such
expenditures in the public interest, the Arizona Supreme Court reasoned that the
right to spend public funds for political purposes "[Of that. right exists at all, ... must
be found in the statutes defining the powers and duties of the commission in relation
to the compensation fund." Id. at 493, 19 P.2d at 682. The court ruled that the rela-
tion of the commission to the compensation fund was "one of peculiar confidence and
trust" and, thus, held that the fund could not be used for any purpose not "expressed
or necessarily implied in the act creating the fund." Id. at 496, 19 P.2d at 682.
" See, e.g., Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds v. Board of Educ., 13 N.J. 172,
179-80, 98 A.2d 673, 676-77 (1953). In what may be earliest case on point, the Su-
preme Court of Washington in 1916 affirmed in Port of Seattle v. Superior Court, 93
Wash. 267, 160 P. 755 (1916) a lower court injunction which prohibited the Port of
Seattle, a government corporation, from spending public funds to defeat a referen-
dum measure affecting that corporation. The referendum proposed increasing the
board of port commissioners from three to seven members and limiting the total
bonded indebtedness of the port. No express authority existed in the corporation's
enabling statute to justify the expenditures, but the corporation claimed it possessed
implied authority to promote the "best interests" of the corporation, including the
expenditure of its funds to defeat a referendum measure affecting the powers of the
corporation. Rejecting this argument, the Washington court held that regardless of
what the port commissioners might determine to be in the best interests of the busi-
ness of the port, such a public corporation, as a creature of the state has no inherent
or implied authority to spend public money for "political purposes." Id. at 273, 160 P.
at 757. Such authority, the court concluded, "is limited to the powers expressly
granted or necessarily inferred from express grants." Id.
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An early decision often cited, is the 1927 California case, Mines v. Del
Valle . 49
 The Los Angeles board of public service commissioners, the govern-
ing body of a municipally owned public utility, had used the utility's revenues
to promote the passage of a bond issue aimed at raising funds for expanding
its electrical generating system. To persuade residents of the city to vote in
favor of the bond issue, the board expended public revenues to print and
distribute cards, labels, circulars, handbills, banners and automobile
windshield stickers, and to construct a float, as well as purchase newspaper
advertising. The commissioners defended their actions on the basis of their
broad authority 10) construct, operate, maintain and extend . . . electric
plants, works, systems and equipments." 5° The Supreme Court of California
rejected this argument and held the campaign expenditures improper. The
court emphasized that the opponents of the bond issue had as much right to
the public funds as did the proponents." The California court ruled that the
commissioners' partisan expenditure of the funds "cannot be sustained unless
the power ... is given to [the] board in clear and unmistakable language.""
Since the commissioners' authority to "extend" 53 the municipal electric service
did not meet this rigorous standard of specificity, the court held the expendi-
tures improper.
Perhaps the leading case on point is the 1953 decision of the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Citizens to Protect Public Funds v. Board of Education . 54 In
that case, the New Jersey court considered the legality of a school board's
expenditure of public funds for the publication of an 18—page booklet con-
cerning a school board building program which was the subject of an upcom-
ing bond election. Most of the booklet contained factual information as to the
need for the proposed school facilities and the cost of the proposed project,
but three of the booklet's pages contained the simple exhortation "Vote Yes,"
"Vote Yes," and another page warned that dire consequences would result "if
You Don't Vote Yes." 55 Justice Brennan, writing for the New Jersey Su-
preme Court, stated, "the board made use of public funds to advocate one side
only of the controversial question without affording the dissenters the oppor-
tunity by means of that financed medium to present their side, and thus im-
periled the propriety of the entire expenditure." 56 Reasoning that "[t]he
public funds entrusted to the board belong equally to the proponents and
opponents of the proposition, and the use of the funds to finance not the
presentation of facts merely but also arguments to persuade the voters that
only one side has merit, gives the dissenters just cause for complaint." 57 J us-
tice Brennan concluded that such an expenditure was not within the implied
49 201 Cal. 273, 257 P. 530 (1927).
5° Id. at 281, 257 P. at 535.
51 Id. at 287, 257 P. at 537.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 282, 257 P. at 535.
54 13 N.J. 172, 98 A.2d 673 (1953).
55 Id. at 180, 98 A.2d at 677.
36 Id. at 180-81, 98 A.2d at 677.
57
 Id. at 181, 98 A.2d at 677.
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power of the board and was improper "in the absence of express authority
from the Legislature." 59
The New jersey court found that the agency's enabling statute did not
expressly authorize such an expenditure. Although the court noted that the
board's general authority to engage in "the building, enlarging, repairing or
furnishing of a schoolhouse" 59 implied an authority to make reasonable ex-
penditures "for the purpose of giving voters relevant facts,"" the board's im-
plied authority to provide public information did not extend to statements
intended to persuade voters to one side of a political question." Under the
court's interpretation of this implied delegation of informational authority,
the board of education might expend public funds to espouse views both pro
and con on the bond issue, but "the expenditure of public funds in support of
one side only in a manner which gives the dissenters no opportunity to pre-
sent their side ... is outside the pale." 62
The New jersey court's ruling in Citizens to Protect Public Funds has been
followed by all of the recent cases on point. 63 The great weight of authority
now holds that the right of a public agency to engage in official partisanship
can exist only if such authority is explicitly delegated to an agency. This limi-
tation on public agencies is true even if the funds expended for partisan ends
are not wholly public monies. Two early cases, Sims v. Moeur 64 and Mines v..
Del Valle, 65 rejected the argument that a more liberal approach to official par-
tisanship is appropriate when the funds expended are not derived by direct
taxation. In Sims, an employee compensation fund was derived in part
through employer premiums"' and, in Mines, the revenues used were the re-
sult of charges to the utility's customers." Both courts ruled that the manner
in which funds were derived did not broaden the authority of the public
agency to which they were entrusted. The two decisions, therefore, stand for
the proposition that the authority of a public agency to expend its funds to
promote a partisan viewpoint can exist only by virtue of a specific, explicit
grant of such authority, regardless of how its funds are derived, and regard-
less of whether the agency is acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity.
38 Id.
5" hi. at 179, 98 A.2d at 676.
6" Id.
"I Justice Brennan stated:
The need for full disclosure of all relevant facts is obvious, and the board
of education is well qualified to supply the facts. But a fair presentation of
the facts will necessarily include all consequences, good and bad, of the
proposal, not only the anticipated improvement in educational oppor-
tunities, but also the increased tax rate and such other less desirable con-
sequences as may be foreseen.
Id. at 180, 98 A.2d at 677.
62 Id. at 182, 98 A.2d at 678.
63 See, e.g., Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1976); Anderson v. City of Boston, 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297, 380 N.E.2d 628 (1978);
Porter v. Tiffany, 11 Or. App. 542, 502 P.2d 1385 (1972).
1i4 41 Ariz. 486, 19 P.2d 679 (1933).
15 201 Cal. 273, 257 P. 530 (1927); see text at notes 49-53 supra.
66 41 Ariz. at 503, 19 P.2c1 at 685.
67
 201 Cal. at 280, 257 P. at 534.
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Recognizing the severe limitations imposed on an agency's activity by re-
quiring explicit grants of authority, courts have distinguished informational
functions of an agency from authority to propagandize on political questions.
In the recent case of Statism. v. Moll," the California Supreme Court ruled
that explicit statutory authority is necessary for a state agency to expend pub-
lic funds to promote passage of a bond issue affecting the agency's activities,
but that it would be a public disservice to bar public agencies from full and
impartial disclosure of information relevant to the bond issue." When a pub-
lic agency gives a " 'fair presentation of the facts' in response to a citizen's
request for information," the agency "pursues a proper 'informational'
role."" Similarly, "when requested by a public or private organization, [an
agency may properly] present [its] view of a ballot proposal at a meeting of
such organization." 71 In close cases, the court stated, "the determination of
the propriety or impropriety of the expenditure depends upon a careful con-
sideration of such factors as the style, tenor and timing of the publication." 72
The California court concluded that "no hard and fast rule governs every
case." 73
As the S1anson court recognized, the restraint placed upon official parti-
sanship by the absence of an express delegation of authority to the agency to
expend public funds in a partisan manner is weakened by the exception for
informational communications. Most government agencies are delegated an
informational function." Therefore, when an expenditure of public re-
sources is challenged as official partisanship and outside the agency's scope of
authority, the court will be presented with the dilemma of determining
whether the agency communication's primary purpose was to inform Or to
persuade. Because of the difficulty of this task, a court may be persuaded that
some acts of official partisanship fall within the information role delegated to
the agency. Thus, if official partisanship is to be effectively restricted, its op-
ponents may he required to base their challenges on more conclusive sources
of law than the principle of delegated authority.
Moreover, two incidental questions arise which make the delegated au-
thority theory even less effective when a private party challenges acts of offi-
cial partisanship. The questions relate to the standing of a private party to
bring such a suit and the appropriate remedy if the expenditures are deter-
mined to be unlawful. With respect to citizen standing, a survey of state cases
indicates that the overwhelming majority of state courts recognize taxpayer
" 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976).
'" Id. at 221 n.6, 551 P.2(1 at 11 n.6, 130 Cal. Rpir. at 707 n.6.
7° Id. at 221, 551 P.2d at 11, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
" Id., 551 P.2d at 11-12, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 707-08.
72 Id. at 222, 551 P.2d at 12, 130 Cal. Rpm at 708 (Footnote omitted).
73 Id. In Stanson, however, the use of public funds to purchase bumper stic-
kers, posters, advertising floats or television and radio spots and the dissemination, at.
public expense, of campaign literature prepared by private proponents was unques-
tionably improper campaign activity. Id. at 222-23, 551 P.2d at 12, 130 Cal. Rptr. at
707.
Sec text and notes at notes 33-37 supra.
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standing and allow private citizens to bring such actions. 75 Approximately
three-fourths of the states allow their citizens, as taxpayers, to maintain ac-
tions against government officials to prevent the illegal expenditure of public
funds." At the federal level, however, a taxpayer does not have standing to
challenge the illegal expenditure of public funds by a federal official when
suit is based exclusively on the ground that the expenditure was not au-
thorized by statute. The United States Supreme Court has expressly limited
taxpayer qua taxpayer standing to suits where federal expenditures are chal-
lenged as contrary to specific constitutional limitations upon the taxing and
spending powers of Congress. 77 For a citizen to have standing to challenge
the expenditure of federal funds for official partisanship on statutory
grounds, the citizen-plaintiff must show that he is "injured in fact" by the
agency's action." The more restrictive federal approach to standing has dis-
couraged citizen challenges, and has contributed to the dearth of reported
decisions dealing with acts of official partisanship by federal agencies."
Similarly, the remedy available to the citizen in both federal and state
court.actions may be flawed. Even if an expenditure of public funds for offi-
cial partisanship is determined to be illegal, an adequate remedy often may be
fashioned only if the action is timely. If the action is commenced at the time
of, or prior to, the expenditure, an injunction may be obtained prohibiting
initial or further expenditure of funds. 8° It also may be possible after an
election to secure a declaratory judgment and an injunction if similar illegal
expenditures are threatened in the future." It is unlikely, however, that a
private party will pesuade a court to set aside the outcome of an election
because of acts of official partisanship. Most courts hold that a person seeking
to have an election invalidated must show that the illegal acts affected the
outcome" of the election. A possible remedy after the fact in many states is
limited to a suit to hold the responsible public official personally liable to
repay funds expended for acts of official partisanship. In most states, either
by judicial decision or by statute, public officers who have charge of public
funds are charged with the duty of trustee to disburse and expend the money
for the purposes and in the manner prescribed by law and may be held liable
" See, e.g., Farley v. Cory, 78 Cal. App. 3d 583;144 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1978). See
Collins and Meyers, The Public Interest Litigant in California, Observations on Taxpayers'
Actions, 10 Lov. L.A. L. 329, 331 (1977).
7 " Id.
77 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
78 See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEvENTIEs 182-89 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as DAVIS].
7" See Mukineeny v. National Coiram'n. on the Observance of Intl Women's
Year, 1975, 549 F.2(1 1115 (7th Cir. 1977).
8" See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Deliver School Dist. # 1, 459
F. Supp. 357 (D. Cob. 1978); Stern v. Kramarsky, 84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235
(Sup. Ct. 1975).
"' See, e.g., Stanson v. Mott; 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 1).2d 1, 12-13, 130 Cal. Rptr.
697, 708-09 (1976).
" 2 See, e.g., Brennan v. Black, 34 Del. Ch. 380, 104 A.2d 777 (1954); Wright v.
Board of Trustees, 520 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1976).
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if they divert the trust funds from authorized purposes." States have al-
lowed taxpayer standing for private citizens to bring such suits and have
applied the above rule to acts of official partisanship." In addition, state
officials who have authorized the expenditure of funds for acts of official
partisanship have been removed from office for malfeasance" and have been
successfully prosecuted under criminal statutes prohibiting the misuse of pub-
lic funds." Despite these remedies directed against the officials, however,
adequate relief may not be afforded in certain instances without affecting the
election result.
B. Specific Statutory Restraints
A second occasional restraint on acts of official partisanship arises from
specific statutory prohibitions. Legislation restricting the political activities of
government employees exists at the federal level and in all fifty states." As a
rule, however, these statutes do not explicitly proscribe official partisanship as
defined herein; 88
 nor do their prohibitions apply to all agencies or govern-
ment employees. Rather, these statutes are directed primarily toward restrict-
ing the political activities of civil service employees in campaigns involving
politicial parties. Nevertheless, this legislation should not be overlooked as a
possible ground for challenging government expenditure of public monies in
connection with constitutional amendments, referenda, or other elections of
similar character. This is particularly true in the few jurisdictions which do
not recognize taxpayer standing to challenge such partisan activity as outside
the scope of the agency's authority. 9" If a statute within these jurisdictions
prohibits the use of public resources for political activity in connection with
questions not specifically identified with political parties, an aggrieved private
party may have standing to maintain an action when the statute is violated. 90
At. the federal level, there are two statutes 91 which arguably prohibit certain
8" See, e.g., Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d I, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1976). 
84. Id.
85 See, e.g., Sims v. Moeur, 41 Ariz. 486, 489, 19 P.2d 679, 680 (1933).
8" See, e.g., People v. Battin, 77 Cal. App. 3d 635, 143 Cal. Rptr. 731, cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978).
87 See generally Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
88 See text at note 8 supra.
8" See text and notes at notes 76-79 supra.
ti" See, e.g., National Ass'n. for Community Der. v. Hodgson, 356 F. Supp.
1399 (D.D.C. 1973).
" 1
 In addition to the two statutory restraints discussed in the text above, a
restriction On official partisanship may appear as an "anti-lobbying" provision in the
agency's appropriation legislation. For example, in Mulqueeny v. National Comm'n on
the Observance of Int'l Women's Year, 1975, 549 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1977), see text at
note 102 infra, a general anti-lobbying provision was construed by the circuit court. to
embrace acts of official partisanship attempting to affect the outcome of "any legisla-
tion, or the adoption, ratification, or defeat of any proposed Constitutional amend-
ment. by any legislative body." Id. at 1119-20. In other instances, an anti-lobbying pro-
vision may be limited to attempts to affect legislation pending before Congress. For
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acts of official partisanship by federal officials. The two statutes are the Hatch
Act 92 and an obscure criminal law entitled "Lobbying with appropriated
moneys." 93 Also, it is not uncommon at the federal level for appropriation
acts to contain specific anti-lobbying provisions. 94
Section 9(a)(1) of the Hatch Act expressly prohibits federal employees
from using their "official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering
with or affecting the result of an election." 4s Although the Hatch Act is not
specifically directed at the problem of official partisanship as defined in this
article—the use of public monies by government officials to promote a parti-
san viewpoint on structured political issues—section 9(a)(1) can be construed
to prohibit official partisanship by federal officials with respect to elections
that are not identified with political parties. Section 18 of the Act supports
this construction. Section 18 exempts political activity in regard to structured
political questions 96 from section 9(a)(2)'s prohibition of employee participa-
tion in political campaigns. 97 No provision in the Act similarly excepts struc-
tured political questions from section 9(a)(1)'s prohibition against "interfering
with or affecting the outcome of an election." 98 Thus, section 9(a)(1) of the
Act can reasonably be read to prohibit acts of official partisanship with regard
to election issues not identified with particular political parties.
Under this construction of section 9(a)(1) of the Hatch Act, an aggrieved
private party has standing to maintain a suit to enjoin violations of this provi-
sion of the Act. The traditional test for citizen standing to enforce this type of
federal statute requires two showings. First, the citizen is required to dem-
onstrate an "injury in fact." Second, the citizen is required to show that the
example section 607(a) of the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Ap-
propriation Act of 1976 provides: "No part of any appropriation contained in this or
any other Act, or of the funds available for expenditure by a corporation or agency,
shall be used for publicity or propaganda purposes designed to support or defeat
legislation pending before Congress." Pub. L. No. 94-91. Often an anti-lobbying provi-
sion may not exist at all in a particular agency's appropriation legislation. An anti-
lobbying provision was not inserted in the Energy Research and Development Ad-
ministration's fiscal year 1976 appropriation legislation., Part of the funds appropriated
were used by the agency to print and distribute propaganda pamphlets in connection
with a statewide referendum in California on nuclear power plants. GENERAL. Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE REPORT No. B-130961, at 32 (Sept. 30, 1976). See text at notes 27-31
supra. Also, it is possible that a general anti-lobbying provision may be construed to
embrace acts of official partisanship in connection with state legislative action but not
with respect to state referendum type elections. Even if a general anti-lobbying provi-
sion does exist, the Mulqueeny case exemplifies the problems with respect to standing
that citizens may face in maintaining a suit to enjoin violations of such a provision. See
text at notes 102-15 infra.
92 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1976).
93 18 U.S.C. § 1919 (1976).
94 See text following note 133 infra.
95
	 U.S.C. § 7432(a)(1) (1976).
" 5 U.S.C. § 7326 (1976). Specifically exempted is political activity in regard to
"constitutional amendments, referendums, approval of municipal ordinances, and
others of a similar character." Id.
s7
	 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1976).
9s
	 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(1) (1976).
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existing sanction, in this case removal from office, inadequately ensures the
effect intended by Congress." A citizen opposing the viewpoint promoted by
a federal agency on a political question may be able to show the "injury in
fact" required for standing, since the effect of the citizen's efforts and his
probability of success are likely to be diminished as a result of the agency's
action.'" In this regard, the citizen's interest in competing in the political
arena free of government financial support for selected political groups ap-
pears to be within the zone of interests protected by section 9(a)(1) of the Act.
Moreover, the injury to the citizen appears to be the type which the Act is
intended to forestall."'
At least one federal court, however, has ruled that such an injury to a
citizen's political interests does not constitute the "concrete and perceptible
injury" necessary to meet the "injury in fact" requirement for standing. In
Mulqueeny v. National Commission on the Observance of International Women's Year,
1975 , 102
 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied
standing to two Illinois citizens who claimed that expenditures by the Com-
mission for the purpose of promoting passage of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment violated statutory prohibitions on the Commission's use of appropriated
funds for lobbying activities. The statute in question provided that no funds
authorized under the Act "may be used for lobbying activities." 1 °3 This pro-
vision was included at the insistence of congressmen who feared that the
Commission would use public funds to promote ratification of the Equal
Rights Amendment.'" The plaintiffs were chairpersons of the Illinois
branch of "Stop ERA," an organization actively campaigning against ratifica-
tion of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment. The Seventh Circuit construed
the plaintiffs' claim that acts of official partisanship by the commission
harmed their efforts to defeat ratification on the amendment as essentially a
claim that their efforts ultimately might prove fruitless. The court ruled that
the plaintiffs lacked standing since the alleged harm was in the nature of an
"abstract injury" to the interest of "concerned bystanders."'"
Also clouding the question of private party standing to prosecute official
partisanship under the Hatch Act is whether the "zone of interests" test for
standing articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 1970 is still fol-
lowed by that Court or other federal courts!" Recent federal decisions on
citizen standing to challenge federal agency action have adopted, in addition
to injury in fact, the requirement of a probability of benefit from judicial
99 See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
100 See Joseph v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir.
1977); McKenna v. Reilly, 419 F. Supp. 1179 (D.R.I. 1976) (by implication); National
Ass'n For Community Dev. v. Hodgson, 356 F. Supp. 1399 (D.D.C. 1973).
101 See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548, 564-65 (1973); cf. National Ass'n For Community Dev. v. Hodgson, 356
F. Supp. at 1404.
" 2 549 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1977).
103 Pub. L. No. 94-167, 89 Stat. 1003 (1975).
104 Mulqueeny v. National Comm'n on the Observance of Int'l Women's Year,
1975, 549 F.2d at 1118 n.9.
"5 Id. at 1121.
106 See DAVIS, supra note 78 at 184-87.
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intervention.'" The Mulqueeny court ruled that this part of the standing test
was not met,'" The court said, lilt is wholly conjectural whether the exer-
cise of remedial powers possessed by the federal court, as desired by plain-
tiffs, would result in the maintenance of the status quo in the Illinois legisla-
ture's posture on the issue of ratifying the Equal Rights Amendment."'" The
court further stated that lilt is [highly] plausible that, were the injunction
relief requested by plaintiffs granted, the legislature would nevertheless elect
to ratify the ERA."" 0
The Mulqueeny decision can be criticized for both its logic and law. The
injury in fact to the plaintiffs was not the possibility of some future action by
the Illinois legislature but the diminished effectiveness of plaintiffs' opposition
and the illegal advantage to the amendment's private proponents by reason of
the Commission's illegal promotion of the amendment.'" This injury is as
concrete as an injury to a business's economic interest in being free from
illegal government competition. 12 Furthermore, the United States Supreme
Court has expressly held, with respect to the requirement of "injury in fact,"
that "an identifiable trifle is enough for standing." "" The Court has indi-
cated that the injury can be in the nature of a reduced probability of favora-
ble action."' Regardless of the correctness of the Mulqueeny decision, how-
ever, that case and others clearly point out the confusion with respect to the
law of standing that now exists in the federal courts.'" Given this confusion,
even if a federal court would construe section 9(a)(1) of the Hatch Act as
prohibiting acts of official partisanship by federal officials in connection with
referendum-type elections, as suggested earlier, it is not altogether clear that
an aggrieved private party would be granted standing to enjoin a violation of
the Act.
A similar potential problem exists with respect to the standing of a pri-
vate party to maintain a suit to enforce the federal criminal statute entitled
"Lobbying with appropriated moneys." 116 Except in certain limited situa-
tions, this rather obscure criminal statute prohibits the use of appropriated
I" Id. at 187-89.
1 ° 8 549 F.2d at 1121-22.
"9 Id. at 1121.
LIU id.
A proper interpretation of the plaintiff's injury in Mulqueeny establishes a
clear causal connection between that injury and the conduct of the defendant sought
to be enjoined. The chain of causation is substantially similar to the chain of causation
against which the statutory language was designed to protect and which Congress
thereby must have considered plausible. The legislative history of the statute was re-
plete with expressions of fear that public funds ‘vould be used to lobby in favor of the
amendment. Id. at 1118 n.9.
" 2 See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Sexy. Organizations v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150 (1970); Hardin v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 390 U.S. I (1968).
113 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP). 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973).
114
DAVIS, .supra note 78, at 188.
"5 See DAVIS supra note 78, at 184-87.
"6 18 U.S.C. § 1913 (1976).
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280-81 n.14 (1978), cited in
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funds "directly or indirectly to pay for any personal service, advertisement,
telegram, telephone, letter, printed or written matter, or other device, in-
tended or designed to influence in any manner a member of Congress, to favor
or oppose, by vote or otherwise, any legislation of appropriation .... ,,117
A federal employee who violates the statute may be removed from office and
may be "fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both." 18
 Since the statute is limited to federal legislation it would not apply
to attempts by federal agencies to influence the outcome of state legislation or
elections. 11 "
At least one federal court applying the "zone of interests" standing test
has allowed a private party to enforce this criminal statute. In National Associa-
tion For Community Development v. Hodgson,' 20
 several private organizations, al-
legedly representing unemployed persons, brought suit against the United
States Department of Labor and a private organization which represented var-
ious state employment agencies. Plaintiffs claimed that the Department of
Labor's finding of the defendant organization's lobbying activities violated the
federal criminal statute entitled "Lobbying with appropriated moneys."
The defendants moved to dismiss the suit contending in part that the criminal
statute was not enforceable by civil suit and that the plaintiffs lacked standing
to maintain the action. The United States District Court for the District, of
Columbia denied the motion. The court held the statute was enforceable in a
civil suit under the criteria established by the United States Supreme Court in
Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States.' 22
" 7 The statute reads:
No part of the money appropriated by any enactment of Congress
shall, in the absence of express authorization by Congress, be used directly
or indirectly to pay for any personal service, advertisement, telegram, tele-
phone, letter, printed or written matter, or other device, intended or de-
signed to influence in any manner a Member of Congress, to favor or
oppose, by vote or otherwise, any legislation or appropriation by Congress,
whether before or after the introduction of any bill or resolution proposing
such legislation or appropriation; but this shall not prevent officers or
employees of the United States or of its departments or agencies from
communicating to Members of Congress on the request of any Member or
to Congress, through the proper official channels, requests for legislation
or appropriations which they deem necessary for the efficient conduct of
the public business.
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of
any department or agency thereof, violates or attempts to violate this sec-
tion, shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both; and after notice and hearing by the superior officer vested
with the power of removing him, shall be removed from office or employ-
ment.
Id.
"8 Id.
11"Id.
12" 356 F. Stapp. 1399 (D.D.C. 1973).
121 18 U.S.C. § 1913 (1976).
12z
	 U.S. 191 (1967). The Supreme Court held that a criminal statute may
give rise to a civil cause of action under the following conditions: (1) where criminal
liability was inadequate to insure the full effectiveness of the statute which Congress
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On the standing issue, the Hodgson court held that the allegations of the
plaintiff organizations satisfied the requirements of the "zone of interests" test
for standing. The court found that the defendants' promotion of specific
legislation, opposed by the plaintiffs, was sufficient "injury in fact." In the
court's view, the lobbying activies of the defendant competed unfairly with the
lobbying activities of the plaintiffs since the defendant's' activities drew re-
sources from federal funds while the plaintiffs' did not. 123 Moreover, the
court found that the injury was within the zone of interests protected by the
statute. The court stated that the plain meaning of the statutory language and
its general purpose indicated an intent to prevent corruption of the legislative
processes through government financial support of an organization lobbying
before Congress. In the district court's words, the statute precluded "the
drowning out of the privately financed 'voice of the people' by a publicly
funded special interest group. " 124
Even assuming that a private party may prevail on the standing issue, it is
not altogether clear that the courts will impose an effective remedy for a vio-
lation of the anti-lobbying statute. A case in point is American Public Gas Associ-
ation v. Federal Energy Administration. 125 In American Public Gas, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia refused to grant injunctive
relief on the ground that the "public interest" outweighed the probable ben-
efit of available remedies. Plaintiffs, organizations representing natural gas
purchasers, sought to enjoin the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) from
further publication and distribution of an 18-page booklet promoting legisla-
tive deregulation of the price of natural gas. Plaintiffs argued, and the court
agreed, that the booklet attempted to influence Congress to deregulate the
industry. 126
The district court, however, refused the plaintiffs' plea to enjoin distribu-
tion or, in the alternative, to order the defendants to delete the objectionable
portions from subsequent distributions.'" Since much of the booklet had
"no lobbying intent or effect" 128 and was "an obviously superficial treatment
of the natural gas problem" ' 2 " and "hardly the type of document that would
strike a person as being particularly authoritative on the question," 130 the dis-
trict court held that the actual and potential injury to the plaintiffs and the
had intended; (2) where the interest of the plaintiffs falls within the class of interests
that the statute was intended to protect; and (3) where the alleged harm that had
occurred was of the type that the statute was intended to forestall. Id. at 202.
123 356 F. Supp. at 1404.
124 Id. The Hodgson court further held that, despite the limitation of the sta-
tute's penal sanction to federal employees, the statute's prohibition on the use of fed-
eral funds for lobbying could support an injunction against the acts of persons other
than federal employees. Id. at 1406, 1407.
125 408 F. Supp. 640 (D.D.C. 1976).
126 Id. at 641.
127 Prior to the suit, the FEA had distributed over 8,000 copies of the booklet to
Congressmen, citizens, federal agencies, and private organizations. Id. The plaintiffs,
nevertheless, argued that an injunction of further distribution was necessary to avoid
whatever influence the booklets might produce on congressional action.
128 Id. at 642.
129 Id. at 641-42.
' 3° Id. at 642.
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public did not outweigh the additional expenditure of public monies required
to delete questionable portions of the booklet in further distributions.' 31 With
respect to the plea for an injunction from further distribution of the entire
booklet, the court pointed out that the FEA was under a statutory duty to
disclose whatever information was necessary to inform the public of the issue.
The court stated: "To enjoin distribution of the entire pamphlet, therefore,
would be to impede substantially the task of the FEA under this provision of
the act in order to attempt to minimize the presumed slight violation of the
statute and the slight actual effect that the violation might have." " 2 The "pub-
lic interest," the court concluded, "argues strongly against" such an injunc-
tion." 3
To summarize, the existing statutory restraints on government expendi-
ture of public monies to influence the outcome of structured political ques-
tions are ineffective. As we have seen, the courts widely hold that the author-
ity to expend funds to promote a partisan viewpoint on structured political
questions may not be implied from, but must be explicit in, an agency's ena-
bling statute. A weakness in this theory of an inherent statutory restraint,
however, arises when the courts must distinguish the unauthorized prop-
aganda function of official partisanship from the authorized informational
function of the agency. In cases in which the distinction is difficult to draw,
courts may be unwilling to act, in the interest of protecting the agency's
information-giving role. Similarly, although some specific statutory restraints
exist, their effect is limited. By and large, these statutes are directed toward
curtailing the political activities of non-political employees in campaigns in-
volving political parties, not in referendum-type elections. In- addition, the
federal' statutes arguably restraining political partisanship may be unavailable
for private - party enforcement and in any case may not provide an adequate
remedy. As with the treatment of an inherent limit on the scope of an agen-
cy's authority, the courts may be unwilling to enforce the specific statutory
remedies in the interest of protecting the agency's information-giving func-
tion.
C. Suggested Legislation
In view of the absence of explicit, comprehensive legislation prohibiting
official partisanship by public agencies in connection with structured political
questions, and considering the potential problem of citizen standing to en-
force existing statutory prohibitions, there is a need for further legislation
from Congress and the states. Without restricting the right of public officials
and employees to engage in political activities on their own time, with their
own money, such legislation should expressly prohibit public agencies from
acting to affect the outcome of constitutional amendments, referenda, and
other issue type elections. Sanctions for violation of the act might include re-
payment of funds expended in violation of the act,'" removal from office,' 35
131 Id.
'" Id.
133 Id.
124 See, e.g., Krantzler v. Board of County Comm'rs of Dade County, 354 So.2d
126 (Fla' 1978).
15 See, e.g., Sims v. Moeur, 41 Ariz. 486, 19 P.2d 679 (1933).
March 19801	 OFFICIAL PARTISANSHIP 	 599
and criminal penalties. 136 The legislation should specifically provide standing
for aggrieved citizens to enjoin violations of the act or to compel repayment
by the responsible public official of the funds expended in violation of the act.
A draft of such an act is set out below. It is not intended as model legislation
but is an attempt to further crystalize discussion with respect to provisions
that might be included in legislation prohibiting acts of official partisanship by
public agencies.
USE OF PUBLIC FACILITIES OR FUNDS FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES
Declaration of Objectives and Policy: The objectives of this Act are to
protect the integrity of representative government, CO assure that
political campaigns and elections are free of government inter-
ference and influence, and to assure that government operates in a
manner so as to protect the governed, not the governing, by—
(1) requiring that the public he provided with full and accu-
rate information on political questions;
(2) requiring that public facilities and funds be used only for
purposes authorized by law;
(3) requiring that public officials and employees be made ac-
countable for their use of public resources and funds;
(4) requiring that all persons and groups be treated fairly by
government in connection with legislation, political cam-
paigns, and elections, including elections of other proc-
esses relating to constitutional amendments, referenda,
approval of bond issues, taxes, or municipal ordinanCes,
and others of a similar character; and
(5) prohibiting the use of public Facilities or funds directly or
indirectly, to attempt to affect the passage or defeat. of
legislation or the outcome of elections including elections
or other processes relating to constitutional amendments,
referenda, approval of bond issues, taxes, or municipal
ordinances, and others Of a •similar character.
Truth in Government: No government official or employee shall know-
ingly furnish false information on any political question or know-
ingly omit material facts on any political question when providing
information to members of the public or their elected re-
presentatives.
Lobbying and Propaganda: Public facilities and funds shall not be used
directly or indirectly by government officials or employees to pro-
mote one side only of a political question in an attempt to affect the
passage or defeat of legislation or the outcome of a political cam-
paign or election, including elections or processes relating to consti-
tutional amendments, referenda, approval of bond issues, taxes, or
municipal ordinances, and others of a similar character.
136 See, e.g., People v. Bailin, 77 Ca]. App. 3d 635, 143 Cal. Rpm 731, cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978).
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Exceptions: Nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent elected
officers or members of the legislative branch from carrying out their
constitutional or statutory duties with respect to legislation or from
stating their personal views of political questions nor to prevent pub-
lic officials or employees from communicating to members of the
legislative branch on the request of any member thereof, through
the proper official channels, or from requesting legislation or
appropriations which they deem necessary for the efficient conduct
of the public business.
Remedies and Sanctions: Any public official or employee who violates
or attempts to violate any provision of this Act shall be personally
liable for the value of the public resources or funds expended in
violation of this Act and shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and after notice and
hearing by the superior officer vested with the power of removing
him, shall be removed from office or employment or suspended
without pay for not less than thirty days.
Citizen Suits: Any person may commence a civil action on his own
behalf to enjoin the violation of any provision of this Act and to
compel the responsible public official or employee to repay the value
of public resources or funds expended in violation of any provision
of this Act.
D. Government Free Speech
In response to the above attempts to restrain official partisanship, gov-
ernment defendants have raised the first amendment. issue to the government
agency or employee's right to freedom of speech. Although there are no con-
clusive decisions on this issue, several courts have addressed the question
whether a prohibition of official partisanship violates the government's first
amendment rights. With respect to the free speech right of government
employees, the United States Supreme Court in the 1974 case of United States
Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers," 7 held that sec-
tion 9(a)(2) of the Hatch Act does not violate the first amendment rights of
government employees. Section 9(a)(2) of the Act forbids federal employees to
"take an active part in political management or in political campaigns."'" The
Supreme Court noted that the government interest in regulating the conduct
and the speech of its employees is significantly different from its interest in
regulating the speech of the citizenry in genera1. 139 Thus, the Court held
that "plainly identifiable acts" 14 " of political management and campaigning by
employees in connection with elections involving political parties may be pro-
hibited. As the Court stated:
It seems fundamental ... that employees ... should administer the
law in accordance with the will of Congress, rather than in accord-
ance with their own or the will of a political party. They are ex-
137
 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
' 38 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1976).
138
 413 U.S. at 564.
10
 Id. at 567.
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peeled to enforce the law and execute the programs of the Govern-
ment without bias or favoritism for or against any political party or
group or the members thereof."'
Surely, if political activity of government employees not involving the use of
public resources or funds may be proscribed, as the Letter Carriers decision
holds, it seems equally proper to proscribe government employees from using
public resources to promote a partisan viewpoint in political campaigns.
In the 1975 case of Stern v. Kramarsky, 12 a New York trial court consid-
ered, and rejected the argument that acts of official partisanship by employees
in connection with such elections are protected by the first amendment. The
Stern court granted a preliminary injunction restraining the Commissioner of
the state's Division of Human Rights and the Division itself from officially
"supporting, promoting, campaigning or otherwise acting to achieve pas-
sage" 143 of a proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the New York Constitu-
tion. The New York trial court held that the first amendment rights of the
Commissioner and the Division's employees were limited to "supporting or
opposing the Equal Rights Amendment in their individual capacities as pri-
vate citizens. " 144 In the court's view, the issue was "not one concerning free-
dom of speech or association, but whether it is a proper function of a State
agency to actively support a proposed amendment to the State Constitution
which is about to be presented to the electorate in a State—wide referen-
dum." 145 The court held the division was not authorized to expend public
funds directly, through promotional and advertising activities, or indirectly,
through the use of government employees or facilities, to secure voter ap-
proval of the proposed amendment. The court stated, "no agency may misuse
any such funds for promoting its own opinions, whims, or beliefs, irrespective
of the high ideals or worthy cause it espouses, promotes, or promulgates." 146
Presumably, the New York court's ruling that a public employee's right to
engage in political activity is limited to the employee's individual capacity as a
private citizen would restrict certain forms of employee political expression
during working hours."' While the New York court's prohibition on gov-
ernment employees using public funds to engage in partisan activity is not
likely to extend to an employee wearing a small lapel button, it clearly would
cover the wearing of a large "VOTE YES" placard or the distribution of parti-
san literature during working hours. The wearing of a lapel button may well
14 ' Id. at 564-65. Even the dissenting justices in Letter Carriers were in agree-
ment with the goal referred to by the majority as "this great end of Government—the
imparial execution of the laws." Id. justice Douglas stated in the dissenting opinion "no
one could object if employees were barred from using office time to engage in outside
activities political or otherwise." Id. at 597.
142 84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
143 Id. at 453, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 449-50, N.Y.S.2d at 237.
1441 Id. at 452-53, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 239-40.
147 See, e.g., People v. Bastin, 77 Cal. App. 3c1'635, 143 Cal. Rptr. 731, cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978); Anderson v. City of Boston, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297,
380 N.E.2d 628 (1978).
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be protected personal expression,'" while the latter acts are likely to be con-
sidered unprotected political conduct.'"
The free speech issue also can arise in the context of government agen-
cies, rather than employees. Several statements of the United States Supreme
Court lend support to the notion that government agencies have a first
amendment right to engage in official partisanship. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that the first amendment gives the public access to discussion,
debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas. 15° More recently,
the Supreme Court has stated that "the inherent worth of ... speech in terms
of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of
its source." 151 The Supreme Court also has stated that states are not "free to
define the rights of their creatures without limits." 152' These latter statements
appear in the 1978 case, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 153 which invali-
dated restraints on the political speech of private corporations. In view of
these statements, it could be suggested that restraints on the political speech
of government agencies, particularly municipal and government proprietary
corporations are improper.
Such an argument was made in the 1978 Massachusetts case, Anderson v.
City.of Boston.'" In Anderson, the Massachusetts . Supreme Judicial Court was
squarely faced with the question whether constitutionally protected speech in-
cludes the right of a municipality to engage in official partisanship in connect-
tion with a referendum issue of admitted public importance where the legisla-
ture of the state has said that it may not. Plaintiffs, taxpayers of the City of
Boston, brought suit to enjoin acts of official partisanship by the city in con-
nection with a statewide referendum to amend the Massachusetts Constitution
by changing the tax classification of property. The city-created Office of Pub-
lic Information on Classification utilized public facilities, funds and employees
to propagandize in favor of the amendment. The city also entered into two
contracts, each totaling over one hundred thousand dollars with political con-
sulting firms in an effort to secure voter approval of the amendment. The
Massachusetts court rejected the city's contention that under the so-called
Massachusetts Home Rule Amendment it possessed the authority to expend
public funds to support approval of the tax amendment. The Massachusetts
Home Rule Amendment permits a municipality to appropriate funds for
purposes other than those explicitly mentioned in the legislative grant. The
Anderson court, however, found that the legislative grant to the City of Boston
was not included in a comprehensive piece of legislation regulating election
financing enacted after the Home Rule Amendment. Therefore, the Anderson
148 See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548, 579 (1973); 5 C.F.R. § 733.111(a)(3) (1980).
149 See, e.g., People v. Battin, 77 Cal. App. 3d 635, 143 Cal. Rptr. 731, cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978); Anderson v. City of Boston, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297,
380 N.E.2d 628 (1978).
' 59 See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
151
 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
152 Id. at 779 n.14.
' 5" 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
154
 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297, 380 N.E.2d 628 (1978).
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court concluded, the election financing legislation manifested an intention to
bar municipalities from engaging in the expenditure of funds to influence
election results." 155 The court stated that "Ulf the legislature had expected
that municipalities would engage in such activities or intended that they could,
[the legislation] would have regulated those activities as well." ' 58
The city further argued that the first amendment prohibited the state
from denying the city the right to expend public funds to influence the re-
sults of the referendum. Initially, the court stated that the first amendment,
by its terms and traditional applications, "has nothing to do with a State's
determination to refrain from speech on a given topic or topics and to bar its
various subdivisions from expending funds in contravention of that determi-
nation." 157 The court questioned whether government expenditure of funds
is protected speech under the first amendment since the means by which a
speaker acquires funds to finance political expression is one step removed
from the protected expression itself. Nevertheless, the court did not expressly
rule on whether government appropriation of funds for official partisanship
constitutes protected speech.' 58 The court held that, even if appropriation of
funds by a municipal corporation to engage in partisan speech is expression
protected by the first amendment, there are demonstrated compelling state
interests which justify the refusal to grant the municipality the authority to
engage in official partisanship. The Anderson court found the state's interest in
"assuring the fairness of elections and the appearance of fairness in the elec-
toral process" '" and "assuring that a dissenting minority of taxpayers is not
compelled to finance the expression on an election issue of views with which
they disagree"' to he sufficiently compelling to restrain potentially protected
expression.
It might be argued that the compelling state interests found to exist by
the Massachusetts court in Anderson do not exist when a government proprie-
tary corporation derives its funds from revenues rather than from taxation.
This distinction, however, has been rejected by the few courts that have con-
sidered it. Without discussing the first amendment implications of a case in-
volving official partisanship, the Supreme Court of Arizona ruled that funds
held by a government agency are "public funds" regardless of the source, and
that such public funds may be expended only for purposes authorized by
law,161 In a case involving official partisanship by a government proprietary
corporation, the Supreme Court of Washington held that it was "absurd" to
suggest that a government corporation could expend funds for unauthorized
155 Id. at 2305, 380 N.E.2d at 633.
156 Id. at 2306, 380 N.E.2c1 at 634.
157 Id. at 2312, 380 N.E.2d at. 637.
158 On this point the court stated "[s]urely, the First Amendment does not jus-
tify the stealing of funds or of a printing press because the defendant was planning to
use the funds or the printing press to publish his views on a subject of public con
cern." Id. at 2314 n.15, 380 N.E.2d at 637 n.15.
159, Id. at 2315, 380 N.E.2d at 638.
1 " Id. at 2319, 380 N.E.2d at 629.
161
 Sims v. Moeur, 41 Ariz. 486, 503, 19 P.2d 679, 685 (1933).
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purposes simply because it was engaged in a commercial enterprise in com-
petition with private businesses.'"
Thus, although any significant restraint of government agency or
employee use of public resources to promote a partisan view on 'a structured
political question must. meet and overcome the defense of government free
speech, such a task does not appear substantial. The few cases that have ruled
on the agency free speech issue indicate that official partisanship is not ex-
pression protected by the first amendment's guarantees. In fact, it may be said
that the first amendment itself is the source of a constitutional restraint upon
official partisanship. The next section will consider the limits on official parti-
sanship imposed by the Constitution.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS
Government expression in a variety of forms is both proper and neces-
sary in a system that attempts to govern itself with a minimum use of
force.' The effective operation of a governing structure where self-
determination is pursued through the cycle of citizen opinion, elections, and
representation demands that public officials be permitted to express their
views freely on even the most controversial topics. The citizens' informed par-
ticipation in the governing process often requires that citizens benefit from
the experience of their elected officials. To ensure this informational input,
the immunity doctrines applicable to high level public officials in all three
branches of government serve to protect such expression.'" Moreover, the
effective operation of such a governing system often requires that public
facilities and funds be used to encourage citizen discussion and evaluation of
that expression.' 65
 But to recognize the broad right of government to engage
in expression only serves to raise the more fundamental question as to when,
if ever, government speech is constitutionally improper.
Addressing this issue in his book, The System of Freedom of Expression, Pro-
fessor Emerson asserts that "the government's right of expression does not
extend to any sphere that is outside the governmental function." "6 As an exam-
ple of this limitation, Professor Emerson states that "government would not be
empowered to engage in expression in direct support of a particular candi-
date for office" since "it is not the function of government to get itself
reelected." 167 Professor Emerson's limitation on government political con-
duct is supported by the first amendment,' 68 the guaranty clause and simi-
102 Port of Seattle v. Superior Court, 193 Wash. 267, 271, 160 P. 755. 756
(1916). See Porter v. Tiffany, 11 Or. App. 542, 502 P.2d 1385 (1972).
163
 See EMERSON, supra note 10, at 698.
164 Id. at 701-06.
'° See Methodist Fed'n For Social Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729, 731
(D.D.C. 1956).
166 EMERSON, supra note 10, at 699.
167 Id. The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that, even in the
area of speech-plus, for government action to be valid government must have a legiti-
mate basis for acting. O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
U.S. CONST. amend. 1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or adridging the freedom of
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lar state constitutional provisions. If Professor Emerson's proposed limitation
on official partisanship in support of a particular candidate is correct, and
several courts have indicated sympathy for this position,'" the question arises
whether a constitutional limitation on government expression also exists with
respect to acts of official partisanship in connection with other types of struc-
tured political questions. The remainder of this article will inquire whether it
is a proper government function to engage in partisan conduct to effect the
outcome of legislation, issue type elections, or constitutional amendments.
The first amendment and the guaranty clause reject the totalitarian no-
tion of Paul Joseph Goebbels that the state has an "absolute right . to
supervise the formation of public opinion." 171 In sharp contrast to this totali-
tarian notion, the democratic process of our republican form of government
embodies the notion that the people, not the government, exercise the ulti-
mate judgment on the wisdom and efficacy of public policy.'" In Anderson v.
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to peti-
tion the Government for a redress of grievances." Id. The argument is made herein
that the first amendment prohibits official partisanship by federal and (through the
fourteenth amendment) state agencies in connection with structured political questions.
The discriminatory aspect of official partisanship which injures a citizen's political
rights by giving an unfair advantage to competing groups in the private political arena
could also be challenged in court as a violation of equal protection of the laws pro-
scribed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments. See Illinois State Bd. of Elections v.
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); McKenna v. Reilly, 419 F. Supp. 1179,
1188 (D.R.I. 1976) (allocation of state funds to endorsed party candidate but not to
nonendorsed party candidate violated nonendorsed candidate's rights under the first
and fourteenth amendments).
169 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. "The United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them
against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive, (when the
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence." Id.
The argument is made herein that, in addition to the first amendment, the
guaranty clause should be held to prohibit acts of official partisanship by federal and
state agencies in connection with structured political questions in the states. The prem-
ise of the argument is that it is contrary to the root philosophy of a republican gov-
ernment to attempt to distort, debase, or diminish citizens' political expression in con-
nection with structured political questions by partisan attempts to promote a particular
candidate or viewpoint. Recent federal and state court decisions have indicated that
the guaranty clause may be held to protect fundamental political rights of citizens in
connection with elections from certain types of government conduct. See, e.g., Moun-
tain States Legal Foundation v. Denver School Dist. # 1, 459 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D.
Colo. 1978); Burger v, Judge, 364 F. Supp. 504 (D. Mont. 1973); Kohler v. Tugwell,
292 F. Supp. 978 (L.D. La. 1968); Van Sickle v. Shanahan, 212 Kan. 426, 511 P.2d
223 (1973).
On the history and potential of the guaranty clause see Bonfield, The Guaran-
tee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV.
512 (1962).
170 See, e.g., Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467-69 (1952)
(Douglas, J., dissenting): Anderson v. City of Boston, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297, 2312
n.14, 2317 n.16, 380 N.E.2d 628, 637 n.14, 639 n.16; Stern v. Kramarsky, 84 Misc. 2d
447, 452, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235, 239 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
171 Nazi Minister of Propaganda, W. SAFIRE, SAFIRE'S POLITICAL DICTIONARY 573
(1978).
172 See notes I and 2 supra.
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City of Boston,'" the Massachusetts court held that official partisanship by the
City of Boston was unauthorized and improper in connection with a proposed
amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution reclassifying property for tax-
ing purposes. As to the first amendment issues, the Massachusetts court not
only adopted Emerson's suggested prohibition but extended it to the statewide
election on the amendment. The court stated, that "[a] political subdivision is
acting outside its government function when it seeks to expend public funds
to tell the people how to vote on constitutional referenda issues which would
affect. provisions for raising tax revenues." 174 The Anderson court's extension
of Emerson's suggested limitation on government speech to an issue type elec-
tion is entirely logical, particularly when the issue relates to powers of the
government agency engaging in official partisanship. Restraints on official
partisanship are even more appropriate when a government agency is the
actor Since the person in office may be less important than the powers of the
office. •
The suggestion that the first amendment and guaranty clause prohibit
official partisanship, whether related to self-perpetuation in office or to re-
ferendum type elections and constitutional amendment processes, is neither
novel nor without. support in court decisions.' 75 As Professor Emerson states:
The government is surely under a constitutional obligation not to
use its power of expression, any more than any other power, to ab-
ridge freedom of expression. Moreover, there is no real paradox in-
volved in invoking the First Amendment to restrict government ex-
pression. The purpose of the First Amendment is to protect private
expression, and nothing in the guarantee precludes the government
from controlling its own expression or that of its agents.' 78
Of course, the first amendment'and guaranty clause do not. prohibit high
level public officials in any branch of government from personally expressing
a partisan viewpoint in an attempt to affect the outcome of an election or
ratification process. Such expression possesses the quality of personal political
expression and is itself protected speech.' 77 When, however, such expression
is translated into government action, through use of public facilities or funds
to finance a political campaign designed to affect the outcome of an election
or constitutional amendment process, the expression loses its quality of pro-
tected personal expression and, instead, becomes conduct. As conduct, such
expression may he proscribed by the courts, like other types of government
conduct which violate constitutional rights.' 78 If, as suggested herein, this
type of official partisanship infringes citizens' rights of political expression
and does not have a legitimate government function in a republican form of
1 " 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297, 380 N.E.2d 628.
174 Id. at 2317 n.16, 380 N.E.2d at 639 n.16.
175 See text at notes 207-30 infra.
176 EMERSON, supra note 10 at 700.
177 See United Stales Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548, 579 (1973).
178 Compare Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) with Bantam Books, Inc.
v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
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government, there would be no constitutional impediment to obtaining judi-
cial relief.''" It is significant to note in this regard that immunity doctrines
protect the expression and conduct of high level public officials only in con-
nection with the performance of a governmental function:"
On the basis of two federal court decisions involving college newspapers
in North Carolina, the argument has been made that the first amendment
does not prohibit official partisanship by a federal agency in connection with a
referendum type state election.'"' In Joyner v. Whiting,' 82 the United States
Court. of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the president of a North
Carolina university could not, consistent with the first amendment, sever fi-
nancial support for the official student newspaper because of editorial com-
ments therein which advocated racial segregation. In regard to the issue of
government speech, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the first amendment does
not prohibit a government instrumentality from spending public money to
publish its positions on controversial topics. As there was no proof that the
editor of the paper rejected articles that were opposed to his editorial pol-
icy,'" the Fourth Circuit rested its decision, in part., on the "strong arguments
for insisting that [the] columns [of the state sponsored newspaper] be open to
the expression of contrary views and that its publication enhance, not inhibit,
free speech.', 184 Similarly, in Arrington v. Taylor,' 85 a North Carolina district
court held that subsidization of a university student newspaper through man-
datory student fees, and university funding and facilities did not violate the
first amendment rights of students opposed to the editorial policies of the
newspaper. The district court's decision noted that the newspaper "invites and
prints views contrary to expressions by those in control" 16" and that the paper
was not being used as " 'a predictable conduit' " 197 for government "to propa-
gate a particular position or point of view." ' 88 The court held that the function
of a student operated newspaper, like a college funded speaker program, is to
educate and inform 166 and that the first amendment does not prohibit gov-
ernment subsidization of such a forum where controversial views are ex-
pressed.' `"`
Despite their apparent sanctioning of government speech, neither Joyner
nor Arrington even indirectly supports the view that the first amendment per-
' 79 See EMERSON, supra note 10, at 706-08.
180 See Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); McGovern v. Martz, 182 F.
Supp. '343 (D.D.C. 1960).
181 This was the position of the General Accounting Office in regard to ERDA's
propaganda pamphlets used in the California referendum on nuclear power. GENERAL.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT No. B-130961, at 30-31 (Sept. 30, 1976). Sec text at notes
27-31 supra.
182 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973).
"3 Id. at 462.
1" Id.
H5 '380 F. Supp. 1348 (M.D.N.C. 1974).
lm Id. at 1362.
1H7 Id.
188 Id.
' 8 " Id. at 1363.
110 Id. at 1364.
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snits official partisanship in connection with a referendum or any type of elec-
tion. In both cases there was no attempt by government to promote a partisan
viewpoint in connection with a structured political question. In fact, both cases
support the view that the first amendment prohibits the use of public re-
sources and funds to promote a government point of view in connection with
an election."' Rather, Joyner and Arrington stand for the principle that
government may facilitate free expression through the educational instrumen-
tality of financing a forum for the expression of all views. 1 " 2
It also might be argued that official partisanship, when designed to per-
form a remedial function, may be not only a legitimate government function
but may qualify as a compelling state interest sufficient to justify any infring-
ment of protected political expression which may result from its exercise.
Such an argument assumes that the system of freedom of expression under
the first amendment and the republican form of government embraced by the
guaranty clause permit government subsidization of a candidate or partisan
viewpoint to assure that the candidate or partisan viewpoint receives equal or
significant support in the private political arena. No doubt, a proper function
of government is to protect the framework or system of free expression. The
United States Supreme Court has stated that, in addition to individual self-
expression, the first amendment protects "public access to discussion, debate,
and the dissemination of information and ideas." 13 A "fairness doctrine" in
regard to government owned or financed forums for expression is an exam-
ple of government action to protect the system of free-expression.' 94 Absent
a compelling state interest, however, government may not restrict the publica-
tion of partisan pamphlets by the supporters of a candidate or policical view-
point to a number commensurate with those published by opponents. 195 Simi-
larly, government should not be able to accomplish the same result indirectly
by supporting a particular candidate or viewpoint. The latter type of govern-
ment intervention in the private political arena infringes the political rights
191 It should also be pointed out that the district court's decision in Arrington is
not inconsistent with the argument suggested herein concerning application of the.
Supreme Court's decision in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) to
certain taxpayer situations. In Arrington the government decision to financially support
a forum where others may express their views was an internal educational matter
clearly proper for decision by the people's representatives. Financing of the news-
paper, in the Court's view, was analogous to paying the salary of a teacher who might
indicate his preference, in the classroom, for one point of view over another. 380 F.
Supp. at 1363. A different result in Arrington would have been proper aif part of the
student fees had been used by the university to secure voter approval of'  bond issue
or the election of a candidate to public office. In the latter situations, the government
action would address a structured political question clearly improper for resolution by
the people's representatives.
1142 Id.
193 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (footnote
omitted).
'" See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
195 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Illinois State Board of Elec-
tions v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
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protected by the first amendment or guaranty clause, unless a compelling
state interest is offered to justify such intervention. 196
The Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Vale() 197 indicates that the
Court will not sanction a system of public financing which permits govern-
ments to use public funds on behalf of a particular candidate or partisan
viewpoint which it favors. 198 In Buckley, the Supreme Court expressly held
that fundamental first amendment rights may not be infringed by a govern-
ment interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to
influence the outcome of elections."" The Court stated, "the concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order
to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amend-
ment."'" Moreover, the Court pointed out that "there is nothing invidious,
improper, or unhealthy" 201 if the resources available to a campaign promot-
ing a partisan viewpoint varies with the size and intensity of private support
for the viewpoint expressed. 202 As the Buckley Court stated, "[i]n the free
society ordained by our ConstitutiOn it is not the government, but the
people—individually as citizens and candidates and collectively as associations
and political committees—who must retain control over the quantity and
range of debates on public issues in a political campaign." 21 '1
As the Buckley decison illustrates, the Supreme Court has not been sym-
pathetic to the view that government intervention in the private political
arena is justified by an alleged compelling interest in preventing expression by
private interest groups from dominating the marketplace of ideas. 204 Even if
the Supreme Court should hold that there is a compelling state interest in
preventing a private group from overwhelming debate and expression, the
argument can be made that the constitutionally proper remedy is to restrain.
the dominating private group rather than to use public resources to promote
a partisan viewpoint that many taxpayers may oppose.'" It is unlikely, there-
fore, even if official partisanship is undertaken to remedy inequitable cir-
106 Id .
"7 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
1 " 8 See McKenna v. Reilly, 419 F. Stipp. 1179 (D,R.1. 1976); Stanson v. Mott, 17
Cal. 3d 206, 219 n.5, 551 P.2d 1, 10 n.5, 130 Cal. Rpt.r. 697, 706 n.5.
'"" 424 U.S. at 48-49. 54-57.
21 " Id. at 48-49.
211 Id. at 56.
2112 id.
21" Id. at 57 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court in Buckley did uphold the
constitutionality of a federal scheme providing public financing for elections cam-
paigns. Id. at 86-109. The Financing scheme, however, did not provide public funds to
only one of a number of competing candidates but rather provided public funds to all
qualified candidates. Id. at 86-91. The Court also upheld in Buckley the constitutionality
of restricting contributions by persons to candidates for elective office based on the
compelling state interest in preventing the reality or appearance of corruption through
the creation of campaign debts. Id. at 27. However, referendum type elections and
constitutional amendment processes do not present comparable problems. See First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978).
204 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789-92 (1978);
Miami Herald Publishing Co. V. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
205 Sec text at notes 234-45 infra.
610	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 (Vol. 21:578
cumstances of political speech, that its proponents could demonstrate a suffi-
cient government interest to overcome countervailing first amendment values.
Principal among those first amendment interests which are infringed by
official partisanship are the free speech rights of the citizens who oppose the
partisan view promoted by the government. The constitutional injury to these
citizen opponents is the diminution of the likelihood of success of their view-
point and the corresponding unfair advantage granted to their competitors in
the private political arena. 2" The courts which have confronted issues re-
garding the constitutionality of this remedial type of official partisanship uni-
formly have ruled that such conduct violates either the first amendment or
the guaranty clause. In Stern v. Kramarsky," 7 a New York trial court enjoined
the state's Division of Human Rights from using public funds to support,
promote, or campaign for the passage of a proposed Equal Rights Amend-
ment to the New York Constitution. Plaintiff, president of an organization
representing women's groups opposing the amendment, alleged that the de-
fendant promoted the amendment by pamphlets and radio and television ad-
vertising. 2" The court granted plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunc-
tion stating:
The spectacle of state agencies campaigning for or against prop-
ositions or proposed constitutional amendments , albeit perhaps
well-motivated, can only demean the democratic process. As a State
agency supported by public funds they cannot advocate their favored
position on any issue or for any candidates, as such. So long as they
are an arm of the state government they must maintain a position of
neutrality and impartiality. 209
Without citing a specific constitutional provision, the court appeared to rely
on Professor Emerson's notion that this type of official partisanship is im-
proper since it is not a legitimate government function. In this regard, the
New York court stated:
It would be establishing a dangerous and untenable precedent to
permit the government or any agency thereof, to use public funds to
disseminate propaganda in favor of or against any issue or candi-
date. This may be done by totalitarian, dictatorial or autocratic gov-
ernments but cannot be tolerated, directly or indirectly, in these
democratic United States of America."'
2 " Several courts have recognized just such an injury to first amendment rights.
See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Denver School Dist. # 1, 459 F. Supp.
357 (D. Cob.). 1978); McKenna v. Reilly, 419 F. Supp. 1179 (D.R.1. 1976); Stanson v.
Mott, 7 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d I, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976).
207
 84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
208 In Stern the plaintiff submitted to the court copies of flyers and pamphlets
prepared by supporters of the Equal Rights Amendment which were being made
abailable to the public at the defendant's offices. One such flyer stated "'It's really
quite simple. Either you believe that all people are created equal or you don't. If you
do ** * Vote Yes on Nov. 4th.' " Id. at 449, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
"9 Id. at 452, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
210 Id.
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This is true, the court pointed out, "even if the position advocated is believed
to be in the best interests of our country. 211
The Supreme Court of California assumed a similar position in the 1976
case of Stanson v. Mo11. 212 The legality of an expenditure of public funds by
the director of the state's Department of Parks and Recreation to secure voter
approval of a proposed bond issue was questioned in Stanson. The plaintiffs
alleged that the Department director used public funds and government
employees to prepare and distribute materials which promoted the bond is-
sue. 2 " Addressing the constitutional issues raised by this type of official par-
tisanship, the California court pointed out that "the importance of
governmental impartiality in electoral matters" 214 had been explicitly ex-
pressed in a number of its recent decisions. Quoting an earlier decision, Gould
v. Grubb,215 the court stated that "our state and federal Constitutions mandate
that the government must, if possible, avoid any feature that might adulterate
or, indeed, frustrate, [a] free and pure [expression of the voters'] choice [of
canditates]. "216 The first amendment, the court stated, "precludes the gov-
ernment from making public facilities available to only favored political view-
points; once a public forum is opened, equal access must be provided to all
competing factions." 217 Official partisanship in connection with referendum
type elections raised, in the California court's view, potentially "serious con-
stitutional question[s]." 218 The California court stated:
A fundamental precept of this nation's democratic electoral process
is that the government may not "take sides" in election contests or
bestow an unfair advantage on one of several competing factions. A
principal danger feared by our country's founders lay in the possibil-
ity that the holders of governmental authority would use official
power improperly to perpetuate themselves, or their allies, in of-
fice... ; the selective use of public funds in election campaigns, of
2" Id. The reasoning of the court also included the fact that "public funds are
trust funds and as such are sacred and are to be used only for the operation of gov-
ernment." Id. Since "people of all shades of opinion and belief contribute these funds
from one source or another," for a public agency to use the funds to influence public
opinion on such matters "inhibits the democratic process through the misuse of
government funds and prestige." Id.
212 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976).
1" In Stanson funds from the bonds were to he used to purchase park land and
recreational facilities. The defendant. was alleged to have used public funds for writ-
ing, printing, and distributing partisan materials; distributing partisan materials pre-
pared by private supporters of the bond issue; speaking engagements and travel to
promote passage of the bond issue; and was alleged to have used government
employees during working hours to promote the bond issue. Relying on Mines v. Del
Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 257 P. 530 (1927), the California court ruled that the director did
not have authority to expend public funds to secure voter approval of the bond issue
since such authority was not granted to the Department in "clear and unmistakable
language." Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d at 219-20, 551 P.2c1 at 10, 130 Cal. Rptr. at
706.
114 Id. at 219, 551 P.2d at 10, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
21C' 14 Cal. 3d 661, 677, 536 P.2d 1337, 1348, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377, 378 (1975).
2111 Stanson v. MOH, 17 Cal. 3d at 219, 551 P.2d at 10, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
217 id .
218 Id
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course, raised the specter of just such an improper distortion of the
democratic electoral process.""
Thus, the Stanson court would examine government action in this area strictly.
A third case addressing the constitutional ramifications of official
partisanship is the 1978 case of Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Denver
School District 1. 220 In Mountain States, the United States District Court of the
District of Colorado enjoined a local school district from using public facilities
and public funds to defeat a proposed amendment to the Colorado State
Constitution. If successful, the amendment would limit the power of all levels
of state government to spend public funds. Several weeks before the election,
the school district adopted a resolution officially opposing the amendment
and urged its defeat. In addition, the district resolution specifically approved:
The use of so much of the School District equipment, materials,
supplies, facilities, funds and employees necessary to
1. Distribute campaign literature to School District employees, and
the parents of children in the schools.
2. The use of telephones and facilities of the School District during
non-working hours by volunteers for the purpose of contacting
the public to urge the defeat of this amendment. 2 "
The school district claimed authority to engage in official partisanship under
a statutory provision which provided that the state, its agencies, and political
subdivisions may "make contributions ... in kind in campaigns involving only
issues in which they have an official concern." 222 The district court rejected
this argument. holding that a proposed amendment to the state constitution
on a general election ballot is not a matter in which the local school district
had an official concern. The court recognized that adoption of the amend-
ment would affect the conduct of the affairs of school districts. Nevertheless,
the court said that to consider "a proposal for an organic and systematic
change in governance of the people of Colorado" 223 to be "a matter of the
official concern of a single unit of government is to distort the relationship of
government agencies to the people who are to be served by them." 224 The
court further commented that "the dimensions of the governmental power
granted to a school district is a matter of concern of the people as grantors,
not the board as grantee." 225
In considering the issue of government free expression, the district court
ruled that an interpretation of the statute in question "as a grant of express
authority for a partisan use of public funds in an election of this type would
219
	 at 217, 551 1).2d at 9, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
220 459 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1978).
221 Id. at 358. In Mountain States, the school district further authorized the use
of a school lunch room and auditorium by the "No on 2-2 Won't Do" Comniittee, a
private organization opposed to the amendment. Id.
222 Id. 	 359.
223 Id.
224
225 Id. at 359-60.
March 1 9801
	
OFFICIAL PARTISANSHIP 	 613
violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. " 226 The dis-
trict. court stated:
A use of the power of publicly owned resources to propagandize
against a proposal made and supported by a significant number of
those who were taxed to "pay for such resources is an abridgment of
those fundamental [first amendment] freedoms. Specifically, where
the proposal in question—placed before the voters in the exercise of
the initiative power—seeks fundamentally to alter the authority of
representative government, opposition to the proposal which is fi-
nanced by collected funds has the effect of shifting the ultimate
source of power away from the people. Do not the people them-
selves, as the grantors of the power of government, have the right to
freely petition for what they believe is an improvement in the exer-
cise of that power? Publicly financed opposition to the exercise of
that right contravenes the meaning of both the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article V, Section 1 of the Con-
stitution of Colorado. 227
In the court's view, expenditure of public funds in opposition to a
constitutional amendment "violates a basic precept of this nation's democratic
process" 228 and "would seem so contrary to the root philosophy of a republi-
can form of government as might cause this court to resort to the guaranty
clause in article IV, section 4 of the United States Constitution." 229 The dis-
trict court concluded by finding that a refusal to restrain the school district
from official partisanship would result in irreparable injury. In the court's
view the electorate's right to a free discussion of whether to approve or disap-
prove of the proposed amendment without partisan participation by the
school district would be irretrievably lost without the intervention of the
court . 2"
The foregoing cases clearly suggest that the first amendment and the
guaranty clause protect the right of citizens to be free from official partisan-
ship in connection with structured political questions since such conduct may
diminish the effect of opposing citizens' political expression and give an un-
fair advantage to competing groups in the private political arena. The cases
also suggest that this type of official partisanship is not a proper function of
government in a republican form of government where self-determination is
pursued through democratic processes. In this respect, there is no logical dis-
tinction between elections involving constitutional amendments 231 and those
involving issues of official concern to a particular federal and state agency. 232
The injury to opposing citizens' interests in political expression is the same in
both instances. For the same reason, official partisanship by federal and state
22" Id. at 360.
227 Id. at 360-61.
228 Id. at 361.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 See Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Denver School Dist. 1, 459 F.
Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1978).
232 See Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976).
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agencies in connection with state proposals or ratification of federal consti-
tutional amendments should he prohibited. In all of these cases, fundamental
rights are infringed and there is no compelling state interest to justify the
harm."
A further argument can be made that the acts of official partisanship
mentioned above violate the system of freedom of expression protected by the
first amendment in yet another manlier. Since official partisanship uses public
funds to finance a' partisan viewpoint with which certain taxpayers disagree,
those taxpaying opponents are, in effect, coerced to finance a political expres-
sion they oppose. The Supreme Court has long held that government cannot
compel a person to express political or ideological views which that individual
finds unacceptable. 234 The rationale, as Thomas Jefferson stated, is that "to
compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opin-
ions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical." 235
Supreme Court decisions have applied this principle to prohibit organiza-
tions to which a person is compelled to belong or to contribute funds, from
supporting candidates, political parties, or engaging in other forms of political
expression with the funds of a dissenting member of contributor. In Interna-
tional Association of Machinists v. Street, 236 a union shop authorized by the Rail-
way Labor Act used the union treasury, to which all employees were compelled
to contribute, to finance the campaign of candidates whom some members
opposed, and to promote the propagation of political and economic doctrines
with which some members disagreed. The Supreme Court recognized that
compelling contributions for such purposes presented constitutional "ques-
tions of the utmost gravity." 237 Consequently, the Court construed the Act to
prohibit. political use of compulsory union dues. More recently, in Abood v.
.Detroit Board of Education, 238 the Supreme Court held that a state, acting
through a public employee's union, may not require an individual to contrib-
ute to the support of a political cause he opposes as a condition of employ-
ment. A state statute provided that unions and local government employers
might agree to an agency-shop arrangement pursuant to which every
employee—even those not union members—must pay to the union, as a con-
dition of employment, union dues or a service fee equivalent in amount to
union dues. Rejecting the statute, the Court ruled that use of funds contrib-
uted by dissenting employees for political purposes impermissibly infringed
their first amendment right to adhere to their own political beliefs and to
refuse to support the political view of others.
As Professor Tribe has pointed out, there is no convincing distinction
between these closed-shop cases and situations where a citizen is compelled to
233
 See text at notes 197-205 supra.
234 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
235 1. BRANT, JAMES MADISON: THE. NATIONALIST 354 (1948) cited in Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 11.31 (1977).
23" 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
237 Id. at 749.
23"
 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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finance, through taxes, government partisan support for a particular view-
point that the citizen opposes."' Professor Tribe states, "any notion that the
very relation of taxpayer to government makes the refund argument inher-
ently inapt seems refuted by positioning a hypothetical instance in which, say,
half the state budget of New Hampshire goes toward broadcasting 'Live Free
or Die' across the countryside.', 240 Of course, every legislative appropriation
uses public money in a mannner or for a purpose that some taxpayers may
oppose. 24 ' Although a representative democracy must operate largely
through majority rule, this alone cannot justify an infringement of first
amendment rights. Most courts would agree that, as a general rule, taxpayers
may be compelled to finance government speech and conduct despite their
opposition, whether the conduct in question be flying the flag over govern-
ment buildings, printing "In God We Trust" on coins and currency, or, to
pick an extreme example, the waging of •war. There is likely to be equally
strong agreement, however, that it is constitutionally improper to compel a
citizen to finance, through taxes, partisan government support of a particular
candidate or viewpoint that that citizen opposes in an election.
The apparent dilemma of distinguishing proper from improper govern-
ment conduct in this context is best resolved by focusing on the relationship
between the conduct questioned and the function of the people's representa-
tives in our republican form of government. If the controversial government
expression or conduct involves a political question which the governing struc-
ture, as established by the constitution indicates is a matter for the people's
representatives, such as choosing a national symbol, motto, or dealing with
foreign adversaries, arguably the first amendment does not prohibit the gov-
ernment from exacting support for the expression or conduct from a dissent-
ing citizen. In this situation, the dissenting taxpayer has•implicitly deferred,
through the organic law, the question's resolution to the people's representa-
tives. The first amendment, after all, does not prohibit the government from
governing, at least until the next election. But if the government expression
or conduct involves a political question which the governing structure, as es-
tablished by the Constitution, indicates is not to be determined by the people's
representatives—such as, who the representatives shall be, or the outcome of
a referendum type election, or state ratification process—then the first
amendment should protect a dissenting taxpayer from being compelled to fi-
nance such expression or conduct since it relates to a question that the
people's representatives do not have implied citizen consent through the or-
ganic law to resolve. This proposed distinction involves a determination of
whether a taxpayer is, in effect, estopped from complaining of having to fi-
nance government expression or conduct with which he disagrees because the
governing structure, established by the organic law, implies his consent that
the question involved be determined by the people's representatives.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized and enforced such a
distinction under the establishment clause of the first amendment. 242 Just as
23" L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 590 n.8 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE].
240 Id .
241 See Buckley v. Vale°, 424 U.S. 1, 91-92 (1976).
242 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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the establishment clause leaves religious matters to the people, the governing
structure established by our constitutions reserve certain questions to the
people or to the states such as choosing the people's representatives or deter-
mining the outcome of referendum type elections and proposed constitutional
amendments. Therefore, since the people have not implicitly consented
through the organic law that their representatives resolve certain political
questions, the government cannot, under the first amendment, compel a citi-
zen to finance government expression or conduct directed at the resolution of
such a question. Professor Tribe suggested this argument in his observation
that "the difference thus far assumed between the establishment and free
speech clauses ... is rendered questionable by the holding of llAbood], affirm-
ing the right to withhold dues from the dissemination of union messages unre-
lated to collective bargaining. " 243
The very expenditure of funds to affect the outcome of a structured
political question outside of the congressional function, the matter having
been reserved by the governing structure for citizen decision, offends a citi-
zen's right of free speech because, in effect, such action constitutes an unwill-
ing financing of government expression. Surely, the first amendment does
not contemplate subordinating a person's right of expression to the govern-
ment's right of expression, especially on a matter constitutionally beyond the
power of government. In Abood the Supreme Court indicated that the ap-
propriate remedy in the union cases is a union refund to the dissenting
non-member employee equivalent to that portion of his dues used in union
political activities. 244 By analogy, a dissenting taxpayer may be entitled to a
tax refund equivalent to that portion expended for official partisanship un-
related to the representative function. Since the total government expense at-
tributable to such conduct is so small, the refund right implied in Abood would
be insignificant. and the remedy may be impractical. A better remedy would
be to srike the entire appropriation and to require voluntary financing of
partisan conduct unrelated to the representative function. 245
Legislative authorization for public agencies to engage in official partisan-
ship in connection with routine legislative matters does not necessarily raise
the constitutional questions presented by the other types of official partisan-
ship analyzed earlier. 24 f' Of course, legislative lobbying by public agencies
involves the use of public funds to promote a viewpoint that some taxpayers
may oppose. One of the traditional functions of elected and appointed ex-
ecutive officials, however, is to suggest and comment on proposed legislation
relating to their delegated responsibilities. The legislature has a significant
interest in assuring that candid input is provided on a structured and con-
243 TRIBE, Supra note 239, at 590 n.8 (emphasis added).
244 431 U.S. at 237-42.
245 See Anderson v. City of Boston, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297, 2320 n20, 380
N.E.2d 628, 640 n.20; TRIBE:, supra note 239, at 589 n.5.
24" See, e.g., Stansim v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 213, 551 P.2d 1, 6, 130 Cal. Rptr.
697, 705 (1976); Anderson v. City of Boston, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297, 2309 n,11,
380 N.E.2d 628, 635 n.1 I. State courts are split on the question of whether a public
agency may engage in legislative lobbying activities. See Valentine v. Robinson, 300 F.
521 (9th Cir. 1924).
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tinning basis on what are often complex and technical issues from sup-
posedly neutral and informed government organizations. The question'
whether a public agency should be authorized to expend public funds to provide
input into the legislative process is largely an internal governmental matter,
properly left to the discretion of the people's representatives. Since the legisla-
tive process contemplates that interested parties will attend legislative hearings,
or otherwise have opportunity to explain the potential benefits or detriments of
proposed legislation to specific representatives, public agency lobbying is un-
likely to distort the legislative process. It is a hard pressed argument to
suggest that legislators are consciously authorizing the expenditure of public
funds to subvert their own independent judgment, given the threat of a dis-
gruntled constituency at election time. The source of agency lobbying efforts,
of course, should be identified and the agency's input open to public scrutiny.
Most importantly, agency lobbying activities in connection with legislation
should be limited to participation in the legislative process itself rather than
attempting, directly or indirectly, to influence legislation by political cam-
paigns outside the formal legislative process:247 The latter type of agency
activity, which is directed at citizen opinion would seem to be a matter not
appropriate for decision by the people's representatives but one that our
democratic system intends to be left to the untrammeled discretion of the
people.'"
CONCLUSION
In cases of official partisanship by public agencies in connection with
structured political questions, courts have narrowly construed grants of in-
formational authority to exclude the power to engage in political campaigns in
favor of, against, any issue or candidate. 249 Courts have rejected the notion
that public agencies possess an inherent authority to engage in partisan politi-
cal activities to promote the "public interest" on issues related to the agency's
delegated task. 2" Because of the grave constitutional questions such a grant
of authority would raise, courts hold that the authority to engage in official
partisanship in connection with structured political questions can exist only if
such authority is granted to the agency in "clear and unmistakable Ian-
guage." 251
 The vast majority of states allow taxpayers' standing to enjoin this
type of illegal expenditure of public funds. 252
 At the federal level, however,
taxpayers lack standing in the absence of a specific constitutional allegation
against the legislative appropriation itself. 2"
In some states, and at the federal level, statutory restraints in the form of
criminal prohibitions, Hatch Act-type legislation, or specific anti-lobbying pro-
visions exist prohibiting acts of official partisanship by public agencies in con-
247 See Miller v. Miller, 87 Cal. App. 3d 713, 151 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1978).
248 See Stern v. Krannarsky, 84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N,Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
24" See text at notes 40-62 supra.
250 Id.
251 See text at notes 63-67 supra.
252 See text at notes 75-76 supra.
253 See text at notes 77-78 supra.
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nection with structured political questions. 254 Citizen standing to enforce
such a prohibition is seldom a problem in the states. At the federal level,
however, the present confusion with respect to the law of standing makes it
uncertain whether a private party could maintain such a suit. In view of re-
cent Supreme Court decisions, a citizen opponent of the viewpoint promoted
by an agency through illegal partisan conduct should have standing as a party
"injured in fact" by the agency's conduct. 255
The United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitutional
issues raised by official partisanship in connection with structured political is-
sues. The courts that have considered the question in the context of referen-
dum type elections have indicated that such conduct violates the first amend-
ment and perhaps the guaranty clause:25 i' On the basis of these opinions it is
argued herein that official partisanship in connection with structured political
questions violates the first amendment since it infringes the political rights of
citizens by diminishing the effect and probability of success of its opponents'
protected expression. Moreover, official partisanship violates the first
amendment since it provides certain groups, which compete in the private
political arena, with an advantage without there being a recognized compell-
ing state interest to justify such intervention. 257 Finally, this type of official
partisanship also violates the first amendment since opposing taxpayers are
compelled to finance partisan government conduct with which they disagree
on matters that the governing structure established by the organic law has left
to the people rather than to the people's representatives.258 These arguments
apply to official partisanship by federal and state agencies in connection with
referendum type elections, whether related to constitutional amendments or
other issues, official partisanship by a federal agency related to state legislative
action on constitutional amendments, and public agency lobbying on routine
legislative matters, when the conduct is directed at manipulation of citizen
opinion. 259
Justice Jackson stated in 1952 that the metamorphosis of adminstrative
agencies into governing institutions "has been the most significant legal trend
of the last century and perhaps more values are affected today by their deci-
sions than by those of all the courts." 260 For better or for worse, their influ-
ence will no doubt continue, in view of the complex social and technological
problems that this country faces. Recent cases indicate that government agen-
cies are attempting to extend this influence to the country's basic democratic
processes—including legislation, referendum type elections and constitutional
amendments.m Official partisanship by public agencies in connection with
254
 See text at notes 87-133 supra.
"5
 See text at notes 102-15 supra.
256
 See text at notes 207-30 supra.
257 See text at notes 197-205 supra.
258 See text at notes 234-35 supra.
259
 The above reasoning also would seem to apply regardless of whether the
public agency is a municipal corporation, a government proprietary corporation or a
common variety executive or regulatory agency.
269
 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
261 See cases cited in note 9 supra.
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these political processes can only demean, distort and eventually destroy, if
not the democratic process itself, at least public confidence in the process.
Perhaps more than ever before, public opinion is affected by the leader-
ship and advice of public officials. 262 This power should be accompanied by
a responsibility that recognizes the simple right of the people not to have
proposed official policies forced upon them. This article highlights the need
for further legislation prohibiting official partisanship by public agencies in
connection with structured political questions 263 and interprets the first
amendment and the guaranty clause so as to prohibit this type of government
conduct. 264 If a republican form of government allows its democratic proc-
esses to be undermined by official partisanship it will fast lose the purpose of its
power in the fact of its power. If basic governing policy in our democratic
system is ultimately to reflect the free choice of citizens, the sovereignty of the
people cannot stop at the end of a bureaucratic tether. Arthur S. Miller, a
noted constitutional scholar, already believes that in some cases individual
liberties are being expanded and protected largely because these freedoms do
not threaten the stability of the governing system. 265 If he is correct, and I
think he is, the constitutionality of government speech in the form of official
partisanship may well prove to be an issue in the years ahead which will have
a significant bearing on whether our constitutional order, while recognizing
that the urgent tasks of government must be accomplished, recognizes that
governing power also must be accountable—to the people.
262 See T. EMERSON, TOWARD A THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 39 (1966).
263 See Part II Section C supra.
264 See Part III supra.
265 Miller, Constitutional Law: Crisis Government Becomes the Norm, 39 OHIO STATE
L.J. 736, 749 (1978).
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